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For a people with fierce nostalgia for republican governance, Roman authors were 
astonishingly negative about the common people who once gathered together to serve as their 
legislature.  Fergus Millar argues that it was the populus Romanus, the common crowd, who 
were the true center of Republican government, as the only ones with true legislative power,
1
 and 
yet Cicero, perhaps the most famous defender of Republican Rome, has nothing positive to say 
about Roman crowds or the power they wield. In his oration against Clodius after his return from 
exile, Cicero questions the very Romanitas of the urban voters that exercised what he saw as a 
frightening amount of power in the struggles leading up to the end of the Republic: an tu 
populum Romanum esse illum putas qui constat ex iis qui mercede conducuntur, qui impelluntur 
ut vim adferant magistratibus, ut obsideant senatum, optent cotidie caedem, incendia, rapinas? 
quem tu tamen populum nisi tabernis clausis frequentare non poteras.
2
 By the time that Seneca 
is writing in the early Empire, some one hundred years later, opinions of crowds have not 
improved. Seneca speaks of the urban crowd with disgust, comparing a gathering in the Forum to 
a group of creatures, worse than beasts, who bite both each other and the hands that feed them.
3
  
Military crowds were just as crucial to Roman life as the urban crowds of voting citizens, 
if further removed from the Forum itself, and their decision making skills, though masked by 
military discipline, were just as crucial. Every Roman army was at its heart a crowd made up of 
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 See Millar, 1-8, for an overview of his thesis that the populus Romanus was the center of Republican Roman 
government. 
2
 Cic. Dom. 89. “Do you think the Roman populace is made up of those who are hired for a price, who are impelled 
to bring force against the magistrates, to besiege the Senate, to choose slaughter, fire, plunder every day? The people 
whom however you could not assemble as a crowd unless the taverns were closed.” All translations are my own. 
This is, of course, a piece of rhetoric, but Cicero would not have used it if it had no ring of truth to his audience.    
3
 Sen. De Ira ii.8.3. Ferarum iste conventus est, nisi quod illae inter se placidae sunt morsuque similium abstinent, 
hi mutua laceratione satiantur. Hoc omnino ab animalibus mutis differunt, quod illa mansuescunt alentibus, horum 
rabies ipsos a quibus est nutrita depascitur.  
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individual men, a fact often overlooked when discussing the monolith of Roman military might.  
Motivating men to go to war is difficult, but achievable, when the state talks of patriotism or 
personal gain; when we turn to the case of civil war, however, the picture becomes much more 
complicated. In the second and first centuries BCE, the Romans were wrecked by decades of 
civil war, a period often depicted as a confluence of powerful generals fighting amongst 
themselves for supremacy. During these wars, however, the generals were not the only ones on 
the battlefield giving up their lives; how, then, did generals convince thousands of individuals to 
go to war for the sake of their own careers?
4
 Although many ancient authors only give it a 
cursory glance, this paper seeks to look at the relationship between crowds and leaders and how 
the Romans confront the question of soldiers in civil war. 
To do that, I have turned to Lucan’s Imperial epic, Bellum civile. Marcus Annaeus 
Lucanus was a young aristocrat in the court of Nero who chose to write a historical epic about 
the war between Julius Caesar and Pompey from 49-45 BCE. Lucan, unlike past authors of epic, 
seems to take special notice of the common soldiers in his poem and tracks the various reactions 
the troops give to the generals who rise to prominence in this civil war.  Some of the most 
conspicuous moments when the common soldier comes to the fore in Lucan’s Bellum civile are 
when the soldiers throw a wrench in the plans of one of the generals, working together to do 
something of their own volition – namely, when their discontent leads to the possibility of 
desertion or mutiny. Throughout his epic Lucan questions why a common soldier would 
participate in civil war, and thus why civil war exists at all, and so he puts a lot of stock in 
exploring the relationship between a general and his soldiers in civil war. One of the easiest ways 
to do that is to look at what happens when the relationship falls apart and, in a typically Lucanian 
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 See de Blois, “Army and General in the Late Republic,” for a historical analysis of this question.  
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fashion, to imagine how history could have changed had the soldiers only remained steadfast and 
put down their swords.  
The disdain many Roman authors both inside and outside the realm of historiography 
show for the fickle mob seems to have roots in a fear of what groups of people, no matter how 
common, are capable of achieving with or without the controlling hands of the elite. Greek and 
Roman historians alike – such as Thucydides, Livy, and Tacitus – tend to depict the crowd as a 
single dangerous and negatively charged entity; epic poets seem to be generally too preoccupied 
with the stories of heroes and gods to acknowledge the existence of common soldiers at any great 
length, and, when a common soldier does speak up, as Thersites does in the second book of the 
Iliad, their depiction is hardly a positive one. Lucan recognizes the power of the common people, 
soldiers included, both as substitutes for epic heroes and for their capabilities when they band 
together. They have the power to change the tide of events if they stand together, but any crowd 
is also made up of individuals whom Lucan wishes would think for themselves and recognize the 
immorality of their behavior – an act that could undermine the commander for each individual 
but would make them lose their collective power. Lucan recognizes this sad irony, that the crowd 
cannot think for itself without falling apart but that historically it has misused its power when 
acting collectively, and makes it part of the tragedy of his work. Unlike many Classical historical 
texts, in Lucan’s poem it is not the mob that is the enemy but the one man, and thus the poet can 
lament the fact that the common soldiers fail to use their power rather than fear the fact that they 
could.    
Practically speaking, mutinies and desertions are bound to occur in wartime. In the case 
of civil war, the role that mutinies play can only be amplified, as morality and loyalty fall into 
ambiguity. Civil conflict based upon a religious divide or geography within a county gives the 
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citizen-turned-soldier a relatively clear-cut choice, a prior loyalty to obey. In the case of the civil 
wars at the end of the Republic, however, such as Lucan’s subject, the war between Caesar and 
Pompey, when sides were dictated by the uppermost level of politics and the careers of two 
charismatic men, the unfailing loyalty of a soldier-citizen was even more difficult to attain. Thus, 
particularly in the initial months of the war when fortunes are yet to be bound firmly to one side 
or the other, potential mutinies played a significant role in the unfolding of the conflict and in the 
minds of the generals themselves. 
It is not surprising, then, that mutinies and their source, the mental state of the common 
soldiers, make a noticeable appearance in Caesar’s Commentarii de bello civili, his third person 
autobiographical account of his war with Pompey in 49-48 BCE. In this confluence of history 
and autobiography, Caesar’s trustworthiness as a messenger of historical truth may be suspect, 
but the significance of the details he includes is not. Caesar carefully records each time that a 
group of soldiers deserts from the army of a Pompeian general to his own, which seems to occur 
most often when the Pompeian tries to run in fear of Caesar.
5
 Caesar often begins his sections or 
new sequences of action with phrases like cognita militum voluntate, implying that he needs the 
willingness of his soldiers to go on and that that willingness cannot be taken for granted.
6
 He 
even tells stories of the preemptive measures generals undertake to try to prevent mutiny and 
cement goodwill, some more successfully than others. Domitius, for example, a Pompeian 
general, is trapped in Corfinium by Caesar’s army and, fearing desertion or mutiny, does three 
things to try to fortify his position: he sends messengers to Pompey asking for aid, constructs 
additional defenses, and promises shares of his own personal property to his troops in return for 
                                                     
5 See the stories of Thermus (1.12), Varus (1.13), Lentulus Spinther (1.15), and Domitius (1.20). 





 This succeeds for a time, but as soon as the soldiers learn that Domitius has given 
up hope and plans to flee, they open the gates and offer their commander up to Caesar.
8
  
Caesar himself undertakes a similar but ultimately more viable scheme when he learns of 
the strength of the Pompeian army in Spain and the fact that Pompey and his personal forces 
would soon join them. After asking the bravest of the Gallic chieftains for aid, Caesar then 
borrowed money from his centurions and distributed it to the common soldiers. By this act, he 
says, he both bound the loyalty of the centurions to him with the security of debt and made the 
common soldiers happy with his generous gift.
9
 This seems to have worked for him, as his troops 
remain loyal throughout the consequent near-desertion of the Pompeian troops in Spain at the 
battle of Ilerda. The only time Caesar records anyone ever deserting from his army is when two 
upper-level Gallic chieftains become frustrated with his rules for their conduct, two books later, 
hardly the most damning of mutinies (3.59). 
Along with the stories of the major mutinies or attempted mutinies from Petreius and 
Afranius at Ilerda and from Curio at Utica, Caesar almost constantly makes mention, often with 
as little as a three word phrase, of the mindset of the troops and what the generals do or fail to do 
to make them happy and prevent mutiny. Although he almost always treats the troops as 
conglomerate forces, two large entities of soldiers and centurions, Caesar cares very much about 
their collective opinion.
10
 For Caesar, at the very least, morale is a significant factor in the 
                                                     
7 “militibus in contione agros ex suis possessionibus pollicetur, quaterna in singulos iugera, et pro rata parte 
centurionibus evocatisque” (1.17). This promise may be a variation on promising plunder after the sacking of a city, 
but the emphasis on suis possessionibus hints at patronage and Domitius’ personal desperation.   
8
 1.20.  
9
 “Simul a tribunis militum centurionibusque mutuas pecunias sumpsit; has exercitui distribuit. Quo facto duas res 
consecutus est, quod pignore animos centurionum devinxit et largitione militum voluntates redemit” (1.39).   
10
 See de Blois, 174 for a description of the role of centurions in Caesar’s army. In his writings Caesar makes a 
noticeable distinction between the centurions, who are often named, interact directly with their general, and are 
famously fanatical in their loyalties, and the common ranks of soldiers, who are often separated from their general 
by a centurion buffer. Caesar himself notes an instance (B. Gall. 1.40-41) where he was able to use his centurions to 
influence the mood of the rankers the night before a major battle in Gaul.  
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success of his civil war, something that never leaves his mind as a general and something he 
wants his reader to take note of as well. Considering his careful catalog of every Pompeian 
general who lost his army and his extensive treatment of the one time someone does desert from 
his side, his skill at maintaining loyalty and preventing mutiny even seems to be something of 
which he is quite proud. Assuming that Caesar never outright lies, whatever his spin on the story 
of his military success may be, we have proof from his writings that the threat of mutiny was 
very real during the civil war and the loyalty of the common soldier was a serious factor for a 
general to consider.  
When we turn from Caesar to Lucan, however, we cannot casually assume that the issues 
of the common soldier and the potential for mutiny will be treated in the same way. Lucan could 
have easily chosen to ignore this fact of civil war and paint whatever picture of loyalty he wanted 
with his prerogative as an epic poet rather than a historian. Lucan is happy to amend, ignore, and 
augment history for the sake of his story and his bleak portrait of the world in any number of 
places throughout his epic, from obvious fantasies like the catalogue of snakes to mere historical 
inaccuracies like the presence of Cicero at the battle of Pharsalus. Although he clearly used 
Caesar’s text as a source for his poem,11 it is equally clear that Lucan was not slavishly loyal to 
Caesar’s version of events or to any ideal of historical truth. Since we cannot assume that Lucan 
would mimic Caesar’s depiction of mutinies and the common soldier, we must consider how 
Lucan chooses to depict mutinies on his own terms and why he returns to them so often. 
  
                                                     





Shades of Thersites: Caesar, Pompey, and Initial Discontent 
 
After Lucan’s Bellum civile opens with the proem, the invocation of Nero, and his 
exposition of the causes of the civil war, the narrative turns to Caesar as he prepares to cross the 
Rubicon and begin the civil war in earnest. This choice affirms the epic trope of beginning in 
medias res even as it fights against it. Although there had already been political maneuvering and 
tension between the two men, the crossing of the Rubicon has been framed ever since as the 
pivotal moment, the true beginning of hostilities from which Caesar could never turn back: alea 
iacta est and the scene it invokes are famous for a reason. Thus in some sense Lucan is 
beginning his action with the beginning of this civil war, sounding much more like a historian 
than an epic poet. At the same time, however, the conflict between Caesar and Pompey, as Lucan 
has just finished explaining in his exposition in lines 67-182, had been a long time coming and 
could not be said to have started out of the blue the moment Caesar crossed the Rubicon. At the 
time of Lucan’s opening Caesar and his troops have been fighting together – albeit against the 
Gauls rather than other Romans – for exactly ten years, in true Homeric fashion. Furthermore, in 
the world Lucan creates, civil war is an unending, unstoppable force, as is the movement of 
Fortune that topples greatness;
12
 for the Romans who lived through generations of civil unrest, 
watching general after general pitted against one another, such a pessimistic worldview cannot 
have been too foreign.
13
 The crossing of the Rubicon is an important moment and could be 
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 Bartsch, 24. 
13
 See, for example, the preface of Livy’s history, where the author laments the corruption of his time, and how 
Rome can no longer bear either its disease or the remedy necessary to fix it (Liv. 1 pr. 9). The steady decline of the 




argued as the beginning of this civil war, but in Lucan’s eyes civil war has long since started, and 
will continue as long as Fortune has greatness to cast down. 
In Fortune’s unstoppable destructive course, Lucan tells us, Caesar is a favorite pawn, an 
eager, rushing force like lightning who is always pushing ahead to his next victory.
14
 In spite of 
this depiction of Fortune and Caesar as an unstoppable pair always in motion, however, it takes a 
remarkable amount of time for Caesar to get going on his destructive path. The first image we 
have of Caesar is one of him stopped, ready to march into Italy but faced with an apparition of 
Roma herself begging him as her miles to turn back.
15
 Caesar musters his courage, declares 
himself his own master and, assuming the role of dux, pushes on. After this moral obstacle, 
Caesar soon finds himself facing another delay – the river itself – and once again has to pause 
briefly before pushing on. This pattern of delay and moras solvit
16
 is one that has been observed 
by both Jamie Masters and Shadi Bartsch in their works on Lucan, perhaps as a sign of 
reluctance on Lucan’s part to begin his project and implicate himself as an agent of civil war.17 
After Caesar faces and dissolves the resistance of the town of Arminium, he has to confront one 
final obstacle: his troops themselves and their unwillingness to march on Rome. Caesar gives a 
lengthy speech to try to convince his soldiers of the righteousness of the move, but he is met with 
discontent and the possibility of mutiny. It isn’t until Laelius, a loyal centurion, gives a speech in 
response to Caesar’s address that the soldiers fully commit themselves to Caesar’s cause.  
This is not the first or last time an epic – or, as we shall see, a history – has opened with 
or quickly turned to a potentially mutinous situation. The first example, as one might expect, 
comes from Homer in his Iliad. Although the anger of Achilles causes discontent in the camp of 
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 Masters, 15. 
15
 1.185-205. See Bernstein, 261 for a discussion of the apparition of Roma as a rhetorical device and her similarities 




 See Masters, 1-5; Barsch, 13-15. John Henderson also comments on how Lucan’s subject pollutes its author (and 
reader) in his article “Lucan/ The Word At War,” 122.  
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the Greeks and private desertion from Agamemnon’s authority early in Book 1, it isn’t until 
Book 2 that we see a full-fledged mutiny on the beach of Troy. In this passage, which takes up 
the first three hundred lines of the Book 2, Agamemnon, encouraged by a dream, decides to test 
the commitment of his soldiers by proposing to abandon the siege and seeing if they comply or 
insist on staying and fighting. The test fails, and the soldiers eagerly prepare the ships for the 
voyage home. It takes the smooth voice of Odysseus to convince the commanders to wrangle 
their men back into order. Once they are back in the assembly, however, the first common 
soldier to make an appearance or give a speech, Thersites, openly abuses Agamemnon’s 
authority and lists all the reasons why they should in fact return to Greece. Once again Odysseus 
comes to Agamemnon’s rescue, verbally then physically rebuking Thersites before convincing 
the assembly as a whole that they should continue to fight.  
When we turn to the Aeneid, the next text to pick up this tradition, we find that Vergil has 
taken the image of the seditious crowd and safely contained it within a simile about Neptune and 
his control over the winds. In the Iliad passage, the rush of men towards the ships is described 
like a storm, κινήθη δ᾽ ἀγορὴ φὴ κύματα μακρὰ θαλάσσης/ πόντου Ἰκαρίοιο, τὰ μέν τ᾽ 
Εὖρός τε Νότος τε/ ὤρορ᾽ ἐπαΐξας πατρὸς Διὸς ἐκ νεφελάων;18 Vergil takes this simile and 
turns it on its head, choosing instead to describe the movements of a storm like the behavior of 
an unruly crowd. When Neptune realizes that Aeolus has sent out the winds at Juno’s command 
and not his own, he gives a short speech scolding the winds for their impudence and then moves 
to calm the sea. Vergil then launches into the first simile of his epic:  
Ac veluti magno in populo cum saepe coorta est  
seditio, saevitque animis ignobile volgus, 
                                                     
18
 Hom. Il. 2.144-146. “The assembly was set into motion like a great swell of the Icarian sea, which the East and 
South winds urged on, rushing from the clouds of Father Zeus.” The simile continues for three more lines, this time 
comparing the soldiers to crops blown over by the wind. 
10 
 
iamque faces et saxa volant—furor arma ministrat.19  
 
The ignobile volgus seems to be referring to a civilian rather than military crowd, despite earlier 
descriptions of the winds as an army put to flight by Neptune, and commentators have associated 
the calming of seditio with a specific exemplum of Cato the Elder, despite Neptune’s talk of 
Aeolus’ kingship.20 Whatever Vergil is trying to show with these dualities, he is clearly 
interacting with Homer’s depiction of the mutinous crowd in a way that is marked, being the first 
simile of the epic, and is playing with the interaction of leaders and their followers without 
having to put the loyalty of Aeneas’ men on the line. 
If we look after Lucan to fully appreciate his place in this tradition, we see that Tacitus, 
who incorporates a number of epic tropes into his historiographical works at moments of 
narrative importance, also opens both of his major works with accounts of mutinies.
21
 His 
Annals’ first major episode after Tiberius’ ascension to the Principate is the Pannonian mutiny 
quelled by Drusus (1.16-30), which is immediately followed by the German mutiny quelled by 
Germanicus (1.31-54).
22
 These two episodes together make up about half of Tacitus’ first book 
and contain all but three of the references to rabies and furor, two of the most common 
characteristics of both crowds and civil war, in the entirety of the Annals.
23
 The soldiers in 
Pannonia, who had grown lazy during the pass of power from Augustus to Tiberius and had been 
hoping for a civil war as a way to make extra profit, were stirred from mere discontent to 
seditious action by a common soldier named Percennius, who used to rouse crowds at the theater 
                                                     
19
 Verg. Aen. 1.148-150. “And just as when sedition often has sprung up in great people, and the base crowd rages in 
its spirit, and now torches and rocks fly – rage provides arms.” 
20
 See Hardie, “Crowds and Leaders in Imperial Historiography” 18-19, for a more in depth discussion of the 
dualities presented by the statesman simile. 
21
 See Joseph, Tacitus the Epic Successor, esp. 9-10, for an overview of Tacitus’ utilization of epic techniques.  
22
 See Woodman, “Mutiny and Madness: Annals 1.16-39,” for a discussion of the similarities in the ways that 
Tacitus presents the two mutinies. 
23
 Joseph, 73-74 n. 128; see also Woodman 11-12 for a discussion of the madness of crowds in Cicero and in Livy’s 
account of the mutiny quelled by Scipio Africanus in 206 B.C.E.  
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and is given a short speech in Tacitus listing his complaints. Here we have a potential parallel to 
Thersites from the Iliad Book 2, a single common man with the potential to stir up his 
compatriots who is treated very negatively by the author. As in Homer and Vergil alike, we see 
both the individual common soldier and the crowd as a whole as a negative force: a base and 
ugly man who has to be beaten into submission, a destructive storm, the ignobile volgus that 
throws rocks in its rage, and now a lowly theater worker with an abusive tongue and a group of 
men who would rather profit from civil war than live in peace. Tacitus’ disdain for the dux olim 
theatralium operarum, dein gregarius miles, procax lingua et miscere coetus histrionali studio 
doctus,
24
 is one out of many examples of the hatred and fear most authors level at crowds and 
rabble-rousers, whether they be mutineers, demagogues, or theater workers.
25
 
The Histories opens with the short reign of Galba and briefly mentions the sedition in 
Germany, but spends most of its time dealing with civilian and military crowds in Rome as 
Galba and Otho each struggle to win over the crowd. This passage, too, deals very directly with 
the question of the relationship between one man and a group of common people and what to do 
when it fails, though it is far less focused than the previous accounts of one set of troops and 
their commander. Here Tacitus seems to be much more interested, as Vergil was in the statesman 
simile, in considering the relationship between military and civilian crowds and the potential 
ramifications for the principate: omnia deinde arbitrio militum acta (Tac. Hist. 1.46).
26
 Tacitus 
sets Galba’s death scene as a dynamic opposition between Otho’s armed forces, lost sine more et 
ordine militiae,
27
 and the crowd of petrified civilians who surround Galba in the Forum. The 
soldiers, bereft of the order that elevates them above an armed mob, burst into the Forum on 
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 Tac. Ann. 1.16. “One a leader of a theatrical faction, then a common soldier, insolent in tongue and learned from 
his study of actors how to stir up a crowd.” 
25
 See Hardie (2010) 14 for the manipulative power implied by Percennius’ theatrical career.  
26
 Hardie (2010), 24-26.  
27
 Tac. Hist. 1.40.  
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horseback disiecta plebe, proculcato senatu, with no thought for the sanctity of the Capitoline, 
the temples, or the emperors past or present – clearly out of their minds, raging like Vergil’s 
storm with no thought of consequences, in direct opposition to upper and lower class civilians 
alike. The unarmed crowd is hardly a positive force, however, despite its seeming opposition to 
the negative force of the army. While the army approaches they stand stunned: non tumultus, non 
quies, quale magni metus et magnae irae silentium est.
28
   Once the two groups meet the civilians 
are startled out of their inaction and flee, leaving Galba to be brutally murdered by some soldier, 
so lost in the crowd that even Tacitus is unsure of his name. Tacitus has set the stage for his 
Histories with a bleak mutiny scene of crowds and violence, where soldiers will abandon any 
semblance of order for the chance to murder their emperor and civilians will merely wait for the 
inevitable and flee. 
This tradition of inaugural mutiny, stretched from Homer to Tacitus, could hardly have 
survived on the back of tradition alone. From a functional standpoint, within the scope of any 
epic or history about powerful generals in opposition it makes some sense to establish in a 
dramatically engaging way that the general must conquer his own men before he conquers his 
enemies. A general with absolute control over his troops can become a dangerous autocrat, as we 
see illustrated so vividly in Lucan, but a general with too little control can be just as dangerously 
ineffectual. The successful quelling of a mutiny could cement a general’s leadership qualities for 
the reader, as it does with Germanicus in the opening of the Annals, and establish the control of a 
leader before his success with his troops is taken for granted for the rest of the work. This image 
of a single man, charismatic and strong-willed, standing up to a crowd and bending their will to 
his own is certainly one that seems to have had resonance with a Classical audience. This image 
proves popular in historical profiles of great generals, as Livy lingers on Scipio Africanus’ 
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 Tac. Hist. 1.40. “Not an uproar, nor a quiet, it was such a silence of great fear and great anger.”  
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quelling of a mutiny in Spain in the middle of Book 28, Quintus Curtius dramatizes Alexander’s 
control over mutinous troops on two separate occasions, and Tacitus, as previously mentioned, 
glorifies Germanicus’ success with the troops in Germany.29 The power of the orator to turn the 
emotions of a crowd, which Cicero admits is necessary,
30
 can be celebrated when the crowd is 
moved from violence to obedience, and can even feed into a general’s heroism.31  
Not all of these opening mutinies, however, cement the general in question as a positive 
figure capable of controlling his men. The success of Agamemnon’s mutinous situation in the 
Iliad is foggy at best, as his speech convinces his soldiers of its literal meaning and has the 
opposite of the desired effect. The episode arguably paints Odysseus as the successful rhetorician 
and hero, since he is the one who reassembles the troops and convinces them to stay, but this 
hardly serves to establish the authority of the general figure, who needs to be rescued by his 
crafty subordinate. Despite the fact that the mutiny is technically quelled, this episode shows the 
lack of morale among the Greek troops and paints Agamemnon’s leadership as tenuous rather 
than strong. In the opening of the Histories, the unrest against Galba isn’t even successfully 
stopped, as he is brutally murdered and his enemy briefly put in his place. This then sets the tone 
for the rest of the period that is Tacitus’ subject, where the opinion of the crowd is fickle, power 
fleeting, and the overall mood bleak. These opening mutinies could be seen, then, as a test that 
predicts the success of the general in question and the tone of his story as a whole; Agamemnon 
has dubious success, but not without great loss, while Galba’s reign is only the beginning of a 
dark period for Rome. Germanicus may never find success as princeps, but he certainly enjoys 
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 See Fantham (1985), 123, for a more in depth exploration of this imagery.  
30
 Cic. De Or. 2.337: “maximaque pars orationis admovenda est ad animorum motus non numquam aut 
cohortatione aut commemoratione aliqua aut in spem aut in metum aut ad cupiditatem aut ad gloriam concitandos, 
saepe etiam a temeritate, iracundia, spe, iniuria, invidia, crudelitate revocandos.” “The greatest part of a speech 
sometimes must be turned to moving emotions either by urging or by some reminder, encouraging them to hope or 
fear or desire or glory, and also often calling them back from rashness, anger, hope, injury, hatred, or cruelty.” 
31
 See Hansen (1993) for a discussion of the rhetoric and potential truthfulness of generals’ battlefield exhortations, 
and Zoido (2007) for a discussion of battle exhortation in a rhetorical context.  
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popularity with the people until his death and remains a hero – a reputation which lingers even to 
this day. 
When we turn to Lucan in light of this tradition and consider his opening mutiny, we find 
that not only is the success of the general in question dubiously won, but Lucan refuses to lay the 
issue of troop morale to rest. Mutinies, both against Caesar and against his various adversaries, 
resurface with surprising regularity and are quelled with varying levels of success as the poem 
progresses. While Lucan may be drawing on this tradition and the image of the orator facing 
down the crowd, he is certainly not doing so to establish the supremacy of a general and move 
on, and whatever tone he sets for the troops and for his poem with one mutiny is quickly altered 
by the arrival of the next bout of unrest. In addition, in this first mutiny, as with Agamemnon’s 
failed testing of the troops, it is not Caesar who cements his army’s loyalty but his assistant, the 
fictional centurion Laelius. The unrest, in fact, is brought on by Caesar’s speech as it was with 
Agamemnon’s, and it takes the speech of a subordinate to resolve the situation. To better 
understand Lucan’s use of the opening mutiny, we must look more closely at the passage itself 
and the speeches that Lucan provides. 
In Lucan’s version of events, after Caesar has taken Arminium he is plagued with self-
doubt, unsure if he should march on Rome. He is swiftly spurred back into action, however, by 
the fated arrival of Curio and other Caesarian sympathizers, fugitives from Rome. Curio gives a 
speech to Caesar that encourages him to advance with his army to Rome, and in less than ten 
lines Caesar is assembling his troops and announcing his intentions to fight against the will of the 
Senate. This episode combines two different historical encounters between Caesar and Curio, as 
Roche notes: one later recorded in Appian’s Belli Civili (2.5.5), where Curio advises Caesar in 
Ravenna to march on Rome in December of 50, and another mentioned by Cassius Dio (41.4.1) 
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where Caesar calls Curio to Arminium to tell his soldiers of the movements against them in 
Rome in January of 49, which Caesar then follows with a speech of his own.
32
  By conflating the 
two incidents, Lucan is able to develop the character of Curio and recognize that the politics of 
the Senate were a motivating factor in Caesar’s march in addition to the general’s pure 
immorality. He is still, however, able to make Caesar the first to try to convince the troops to 
participate in civil war and reinforce his monstrous characterization of the general. Lucan’s 
invented scene also creates yet another parallel to the potential mutiny scene in the Iliad, where 
Agamemnon’s decision to test his troops with his speech was prompted by the arrival and advice 
of a trusted political ally, in that instance a false specter of Nestor in a dream. Curio, an infamous 
turncoat who had been vocally opposed to the triumvirs in the 50s but began speaking well of 
Caesar shortly after achieving office,
33
 is hardly a suitable substitute for Nestor in terms of 
wisdom or eminence, but he proves to be equally persuasive. 
Making Caesar’s speech to the troops and his final decision to march upon Rome 
coincide with Curio’s arrival in Arminium, however, postpones the decisive moment until Caesar 
has already crossed the Rubicon. This allows Lucan to add yet more layers of delay before 
Caesar’s fated march on the city, as Caesar faces the obstacles of his own self-doubt and then of 
his soldiers’ morale even after the river is crossed. Lucan is eager to point out the heavy hand of 
Fortuna and the hopelessness of resisting Caesar at every chance he gets,
34
 and as the consumers 
of a historical epic his readers are awaiting Caesar’s march with anticipatory dread. Lucan plays 
on this tension between the reader’s reluctant knowledge of Caesar’s ultimate success and the 
hope that this series of delays provides. He offers the reader chance after chance for Caesar to 
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 Roche, n. 266-95.  
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 See Roche, n. 269 for a discussion of the ancient rumor that Caesar bribed Curio to switch sides and the modern 
skepticism surrounding it.  
34
 For example, while Caesar is hesitating and Curio is yet to arrive, Lucan writes, “iustos Fortuna laborat/ Esse 
ducis motus et causas invenit armis,” or “Fate labored to make the movements of the leader just, and found causes 
for arms” (1.264-265).  
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turn back and change history, even after the Rubicon has been crossed and conflict seems 
unavoidable.  
Within this confluence of historical events we find Caesar’s first speech to his troops and 
his first attempt to convince them to stand with him in face of civil war. The corresponding 
speech in Caesar’s own work (BC 1.7.1) occurs in Ravenna before the crossing of the Rubicon, 
and the oration is reported in indirect speech as a rather dry list of the wrongs done to Caesar by 
anonymous enemies and the injuries to the office of the tribune. Caesar does not blame Pompey, 
with whom he is still in strained correspondence, for their falling out, but rather the enemies that 
have used envy to lead his old friend astray. The vast majority of the reported speech is taken up 
with a discussion of the weakening of the tribunician veto, with a note that not even Sulla took 
that power away. Although Caesar ends with an exhortation that they defend the honor of the 
general who led them on so many successful campaigns in the past, the politics that occupy most 
of the summary seems to be less than inspirational. In response, however, the Thirteenth Legion 
cries out sese paratos esse imperatoris sui tribunorumque plebis iniurias defendere,
35
 
acknowledging with their positive response to such a technical speech that they are fighting not 
only for Caesar, but for a serious legal issue.       
Although Caesar only gives us the summary of his speech in indirect speech, we expect 
the speech of Lucan’s Caesar to have at least a similar backbone to its historical antecedent, 
despite its transplant from one side of the Rubicon to the other. The two speeches, however, are 
barely even recognizable as related. Lucan opens Caesar’s speech with bellorum o socii, a phrase 
that, while likely looking back to Caesar’s famous historical use of commilitiones,36 introduces a 
central line of reasoning absent from Caesar’s own report of the incident. Lucan’s Caesar 
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 1.7.8. “That they were ready to defend against the injuries to their general and to the tribunes of the plebs.” 
36
 See Roche, 299 n. 
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bookends his speech with appeals to his soldiers’ personal investment in the issue, the wrongs 
done to them personally, and the reasons why he and his soldiers are on the same level. He 
invokes their past service with him and implies that Rome is readying for war against them as 
much as against him and treating them like foreign enemies – Hannibal, to be specific – rather 
than heroes who have just spent ten years spilling their blood for their country. From his 
assertion that wrongs against Caesar are also wrongs against his soldiers, Caesar moves on to the 
main body of his speech, namely increasingly colorful invective against Pompey and the 
lawlessness he has established in Rome. Caesar the historian had blamed others for Pompey’s 
misguidance and the state of Rome, with a subtle jab at Pompey for crossing a border that even 
Sulla left inviolate, the tribunician veto. Lucan’s Caesar, on the other hand, assaults Pompey for 
30 lines as a lifelong tyrant, though without mention of the tribunician veto in specific, and 
compares him to Sulla in terms more sensational than legal for a significant portion of the 
attack.
37
 This picture of Pompey is so abhorrent that it is hard to believe that the speaker of the 
speech could have ever considered himself a friend or ally of its subject, a fact the historical 
Caesar clings to with remorse while Lucan’s character ignores it. After this lengthy middle 
section Lucan’s Caesar returns to the fate of his beloved soldiers, bemoaning, mihi si merces 
erepta laborum est,/ his saltem longi non cum duce praemia belli/ reddantur; miles sub quolibet 
iste triumphet.
38
 He then moves on to describe how they will be forced to live if they lose the 
war, landless and worse than criminals, before finally exhorting them [detrahere] dominos urbi 
servire paratae.
39  
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 See 1.324-335 especially for the discussion of Pompey’s connection to Sulla and the colorful imagery that Lucan 
conjures. 
38
 1.340-342. “If the reward of labors is stolen away from me, let the prizes of long war be returned to them at least 





When we compare the two speeches, the tactics Lucan gives to his Caesar become clear 
in contrast. His soldiers should fight with him, not out of particular love for him or legal 
particulars, but because they are being personally threatened by Pompey’s tyrannical leanings 
and have to stop them to get what they deserve and to save Rome herself. These admittedly 
grandiose arguments seem like they should have been convincing, hinging upon both self-
interest and noble loyalty to Rome, with a clear depraved enemy to depose. Lucan’s readers are 
expecting this speech to succeed, whether they recognize the scene from Caesar’s commentaries 
or merely know their national history, especially since Caesar has pushed past so many obstacles 
already. Lucan even sets the speech up as that of an epic hero addressing his comrades or 
followers about their future successful endeavors with vocabulary and theme.
40
 He alludes 
directly to Aeneas’ speech to his troops in Aen. 1.198, which opens with a similar O socii and 
continues on to address the same theme of past troubles that have been overcome.
41
  
Once again, however, Lucan turns the tables on his readers and dashes their expectations. 
Caesar’s speech is met not with enthusiastic promises, but with muttering and uncertainty. At 
dubium non claro murmure volgus/ secum incerta fremit, Lucan writes, and cites pietas and the 
penates as the reason for their hesitation.
42
 Apparently, though Caesar attempted to persuade 
them that Pompey was a danger to Rome, the soldiers were either unconvinced or simply too 
pious to march on Rome, despite a potentially legitimate reason. Lucan has framed Caesar as an 
epic hero with allusions to the opening of the Aeneid, and Aeneas’ speech of an epic hero 
offering encouragement to his comrades is even part of a larger tradition of such speeches that 
begins with Odysseus (Od. 12.208-12). By placing Caesar in this tradition, only to cast him 
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 See Roche, 299 n. See also Masters, 4 for a discussion of the parallels between Caesar and Aeneas. 
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 The entire opening reads, O socii (neque enim ignari sumus ante malorum),/ o passi graviora, dabit deus his 
quoque finem. “Oh companions (for we are not ignorant of past troubles), oh you who have suffered heavier things, 
the god will grant an end to these things also.” 
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 1.352-353. “But the doubtful crowd, with an indistinct murmur, muttered uncertainties with itself.”  
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down, Lucan both plays with the expectations of his readers and makes bitter commentary on the 
tropes of the epic genre.  
The suspense is short-lived, however, as Lucan foreshadows the content and outcome of 
Laelius’ speech before we even hear the centurion’s name: sed diro ferri revocantur amore/ 
ductorisque metu.
43
 Laelius then enters the scene and delivers a speech that is ostensibly 
directed, like Curio’s, not at the assembled troops but at Caesar himself. Although these two 
speeches make a pair, it is not Caesar who needs convincing that marching to Rome is the right 
path; it is the assembled army that needs to hear Laelius’ words, and it is their response that 
allows Caesar to push on towards his inexorable fate.  
Laelius’ speech is the antithesis of Caesar’s in content and rhetorical tack. The centurion 
makes no attempt at logical reasoning and spends very little time slandering Caesar’s enemies, 
mentioning the Senate once and Pompey not at all. Most noticeably, where Caesar makes an 
effort to place himself on the level of his soldiers, Laelius pushes in the opposite direction and 
forcibly elevates Caesar beyond the status of general to replace Rome herself as the ultimate 
object of his soldiers’ loyalty. The very first lines of each speech clearly define this opposition 
with their addressees: while Caesar began his speech with bellorum o socii, Laelius addresses his 
leader as Romani maxime rector nominis.
44
 This title, as Roche points out, already links Caesar 
to Jupiter in Laelius’ eyes, and the near-worship continues as Laelius’ conviction gets more and 
more fervent.
45
 In his opening phrase, Laelius brings up the moral language of ius as a frame for 
the entire speech, setting himself up within the bounds of the same moral system that was 
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 1.355-356. “But they were called back by their terrible love of the sword and the fear of their leader.” 
44
 1.359-360, “Greatest guide of the Roman name.”  
45
 See Roche 359-60 n. for examples of similar appellations in Vergil and Seneca. Also see Sarah Nix, “Caesar as 
Jupiter in Lucan's ‘Bellum Civile’” for a further exploration of this theme in Lucan. 
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troubling the common soldiers with pietas seven lines earlier.
46
 After a protestation that Caesar 
must not trust his troops if he has not marched on Rome already, an effective jab at the guilt of 
the listening soldiers who are wavering in their loyalty, Laelius confronts the all-important 
question head on: usque adeo miserum est, civili vincere bello?
47
  
Laelius provides his own answer with no hesitation. Duc, he says, lead us on wherever 
you may wish. He then combines his elevation of Caesar with his introduction of a moral code to 
make the two one and the same, explaning, nec civis meus est, in quem tua classica, Caesar,/ 
audiero.
48
 Despite his mention of civil war as a positive, as Matthew Roller rightly argues in his 
article “Ethical Contradiction and the Fractured Community in Lucan's ‘Bellum Civile,’” Laelius 
is introducing for the first time an alienating picture of civil war, in which the enemies of his 
commander are effectively foreigners, and Caesar’s will replaces the soldier’s moral compass.49 
This is further demonstrated by Laelius’ promises as the speech continues, as he pledges to 
perform increasingly perverse and amoral acts if Caesar wishes them done. He presents the 
appalling images of fratricide, patricide, and the slaughter of his pregnant wife and child in 
visceral detail as acts he would be willing to commit for Caesar before turning to the burning of 
temples and, finally, the destruction of Rome herself.
50
 While Caesar had tried to frame the 
coming campaign as a quest to save Rome from a tyrant, ending his speech with the image of 
dragging despots out of a city ready to serve, the final image of Laelius’ speech is that of Rome’s 
destruction, willingly if not cheerfully enacted by the soldiers once loyal to her. With this, 
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 At 1.359-60, the speech opens under the qualification “Si licet… et ius est, veras expromere voces,” “if it is 
permitted and just, to display true voices.” 
47
 1.366, “Is it so terrible, to conquer in civil war?”  
48
 1.373-374, “Nor is he my countryman, Caesar, against whom I will hear your trumpets.”  
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 See especially pages 329-330 in Roller for his discussion of Laelius and his speech. 
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 1.376-386. See Roche 271-274 for a further exploration of the way in which Lucan constructs these images, their 
intertextual flavors, and where they come back later in Lucan’s own epic and prove Laelius to be a grim prophet. 
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Laelius has constructed an entirely new moral order with Caesar at its head and no culpability for 
the soldiers who enact it, and Rome’s power has been eclipsed.  
This is the argument that sways Caesar’s soldiers and finally sets them decisively on the 
path to civil war; his cunctae simul adsensere cohortes,/ elatasque alte, quaecumque ad bella 
vocaret,/ promisere manus.
51
 Despite Caesar’s best efforts, they could not be exhorted to civil 
war within the bounds of their old moral system, no matter how colorfully Caesar painted 
Pompey’s picture. In addition, the soldiers could not be cajoled into serving through talk of 
equality with their general. Even though it was ostensibly aimed at Caesar and not the other 
soldiers, one man’s promise of devotion, this seemingly crazed promise convinces the other 
soldiers to fight and adopt a similar attitude.  
This new system as proposed by Laelius is clearly not one the reader should agree with 
on a moral level. Even if Laelius had not ended his speech with images of pregnant wives 
slaughtered by their husbands, burning temples, and the crumbling walls of Rome – images 
clearly meant to incite the reader’s horror – Lucan leaves clues throughout the speech that point 
to Laelius’ depravity with the bitter irony that Lucan so loves. For example, when Laelius 
attempts to convince his fellow soldiers with the entreaty usque adeo miserum est civili vincere 
bello, Lucan is making an intertextual allusion to Book 12 of the Aeneid, as Roche points out, 
where Turnus asks his sister usque adeone mori miserum est?
52
 In this passage, Aeneas has just 
attacked Latinus’ city, which had been left undefended, and Turnus is deliberating whether he 
should go and try to protect the city, which would likely claim his life. With this question, 
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 1.386-388, “All the cohorts at once assented to these things, and promised their hands, which they raised on high, 
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Turnus decides that defending the city is more important than his own life and sets off to face his 
noble and tragic end – the precise opposite of Laelius, who essentially damns Rome and her 
sanctity during his speech. The fact that Laelius comes to the opposite conclusion of Turnus, 
putting individual well-being over the state of the city, coupled with the fact that the potentially 
noble mori has been replaced by civili vincere bello, signals the reader that Laelius’ code is not 
to be admired. Nevertheless, Lucan claims, this is the kind of intrinsically flawed argument 
needed to enact civil war. 
The advent of this new moral code is something that Lucan takes care to emphasize. He 
has created an entirely fictitious episode within a conflation of two historical events, then spends 
one hundred lines recording Caesar’s speech, Laelius’ speech, and the reactions of the assembled 
soldiers to each oration. Had he merely wanted to show the depravity of Caesar and the way that 
he led his troops, Lucan could have given Laelius’ speech to Caesar and made his monstrous 
anti-hero all the more sinister for coming up with a twisted moral scheme centered around his 
own godlike status. If he wanted to play on the theme of the opening mutiny and give the troops 
both discontent and a voice with which to raise it, adding a Thersites figure to the mix, he could 
have articulated the complaints of the troops through a similar lowly mouthpiece. He could have 
even included Laelius’ speech but labeled it as the voice of the collective body of men, as he 
does in lines 1.248-256 when the townspeople of Arminium protest the advance of Caesar. 
Instead, Lucan gives the speech that in many ways sets the tone of Caesar’s behavior for the rest 
of the epic to a named character of his own creation.  
Laelius has the dubious distinction of being one of Lucan’s only entirely fictional named 
characters, and despite his brief appearance, he is vividly characterized as an amoral fanatic who 
in a sense launches Caesar’s campaign against Pompey. Apart from the content of his speech, 
23 
 
Laelius gets a brief introduction as summi tunc munera pili/ Laelius, emeritique gerens insignia 
doni,/ servati civis referentem praemia quercum.
53
 Laelius is a centurion, a soldier lower in class 
who has risen through the ranks of the army by his own merits, and the primus pilus at that, 
showing that he has risen as far as he could possibly go to a position that essentially makes him 
the highest of the common soldiers. In addition, he has won the corona civica for saving a 
Roman life, a significant military honor. Given these details, the reader would expect the speech 
he gives to be as honorable as his military career, an expectation sorely dashed.  
In addition, however, Laelius stands as the voice of the common soldier, the only one the 
reader has heard yet in the course of the epic. In the writings of the historical Caesar, the primus 
pilus would act as a liaison between the general and the common soldiers, and as the centurion 
set above the rest, Laelius can be expected to straddle the worlds of the officers and the 
rankers.
54
 In some ways, Laelius, as a centurion, can be seen as a chorus leader for the common 
soldiers, still one of them but a leader and a crystallization of their common fears and desires. 
Despite this slightly elevated role, it is still notable that Lucan not only gives a common soldier 
of his own creation a name and a voice, but allows him to correct one of Caesar’s failures. The 
character may not be an admirable one morally speaking, but he is far from a base creature who 
hinders the goals of his betters. His military record paints him as the perfect soldier and, with the 
corona civica, the perfect Roman soldier. The fact that a soldier celebrated for his preservation 
of Roman life would go on to make the speech that he does about his willingness to slaughter 
Romans in civil war fits once again into Lucan’s bitter sense of irony, as Roche notes, but Roller 
points out that his award can also show that Laelius has earned the trust and approval of his 
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 1.356-358, “Then the officer of the greatest spear (the primus pilus centurion, or the highest ranking centurion of 
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 Caes. Gal. 1.41.3, 7.17.8. See Roche, 356-7 n.  
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community, having exemplified virtus and pietas in the eyes of his compatriots.
55
 Perhaps 
Laelius’ new moral framework is so effective in changing the common soldiers’ minds because 
he has already earned the authority to make such judgments based on his past heroism. Laelius, 
unlike Caesar, is truly one of the commilitiones, a common soldier and a leader, who can elevate 
his general above the troops while remaining one of them. 
  This scene is made all the more remarkable if we look again to Lucan’s original model, 
the almost-mutiny at the start of the second book of the Iliad. In the Iliad, we have a general with 
dangerously autocratic tendencies, Agamemnon, who gives a speech to his troops suggesting 
they leave Troy in the hope that they will refuse, after being prompted in a dream by a vision of 
Nestor to do so. In Lucan, we also have a general with dangerously autocratic tendencies, 
Caesar, who gives a speech to his troops suggesting they march with him in civil war in all 
earnestness, after being prompted by Curio to do so. Each general fails to accomplish his goal, 
though their failures manifest in different ways. Agamemnon convinces his troops to obey the 
literal words of his speech, but he had been hoping for failure rather than success, while Caesar 
simply fails to be convincing.  
The reactions of the troops, although both far from the desired effect, are actually quite 
different from one another, and for once Lucan is the one who treats a potentially dramatic 
episode with brevity. Caesar’s troops mutter among themselves for two lines, paralyzed into 
inaction by their lingering morals, but are soon swayed by the words of Laelius and propel 
themselves into motion. Agamemnon’s troops, on the other hand, are inspired by his speech and 
launch into motion before he has the chance to stop them, preparing the ships for the voyage 
home and receiving a six line simile comparing their movements to the power of the wind. The 
gods have to become involved to stop the flight, and Odysseus has to address both the 
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commanders and the common soldiers with tailored speeches to get them all back into an 
assembly. One disappointed common soldier, Thersites, rears his head and articulates his 
complaints to Agamemnon, and has to be put down by Odysseus, this time with violence as well 
as words, before the crafty general can convince the soldiers to stay and begin to clean up 
Agamemnon’s mess. Odysseus and Laelius, one of the greatest heroes of the Greeks and a 
fictional centurion, have parallel roles as they convince the troops to follow their commander 
with successful speeches after the commander has failed, but Lucan takes only seven lines to get 
from Caesar’s speech to Laelius’; Homer takes one hundred and forty two.  
If we return to the initial image of Agamemnon’s troops streaming out of the assembly to 
ready the ships and their comparison to the wind, we can see that Lucan is creating further 
dialogue with Homer and the two bodies of soldiers by transplanting that imagery from the 
mutinous troops to the newly convinced soldiers showing their support for Caesar. Homer 
describes the disbandment:  
κινήθη δ᾽ ἀγορὴ φὴ κύματα μακρὰ θαλάσσης 
πόντου Ἰκαρίοιο, τὰ μέν τ᾽ Εὖρός τε Νότος τε 
ὤρορ᾽ ἐπαΐξας πατρὸς Διὸς ἐκ νεφελάων. 
ὡς δ᾽ ὅτε κινήσῃ Ζέφυρος βαθὺ λήϊον ἐλθὼν 
λάβρος ἐπαιγίζων, ἐπί τ᾽ ἠμύει ἀσταχύεσσιν.56  
 
When Odysseus finally convinces the troops to stay and fight, they cheer and praise him, but 
they fail to put their enthusiasm to action and the narrative soon moves on to a speech from 
Nestor describing battle plans. In Lucan, the responses to the two speeches are reversed, though 
the effectiveness of each response is the same. Caesar’s speech is met with a brief and muted 
verbal response, while after Laelius has finished speaking, the troops pledge their allegiance to 
Caesar and action follows:  
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…it tantus ad aethera clamor, 
quantus, piniferae Boreas cum Thracius Ossae  
rupibus incubuit, curvato robore pressae 




Both of these passages have imagery of the wind, whether it be East, South, West, or North, 
coming up against flat obstacles – the surface of the sea for Homer, and the faces of cliffs for 
Lucan – and bending down vegetation – a field of wheat for Homer, and oaks in a forest for 
Lucan. If the parallels in story were not enough, this deliberately crafted imitation of imagery 
shows that Lucan is acknowledging the Homer passage and using the consequences implied by 
his imitation to his advantage. 
If Caesar is Agamemnon and Curio is the shade of Nestor, then Laelius is Odysseus. 
Their speeches are utterly dissimilar – Laelius proposes a new moral code with Caesar at its 
head, while Odysseus reminds Agamemnon and the troops of Calchas’ prophecy that they only 
have to hold on one more year before victory – and yet both start off their speeches addressing 
the commander whose troops are reluctant to fight, but intend their words most for the ears of the 
unwilling soldiers, who promptly agree to take up arms for their commander once more.
58
  This 
is a fact that is worth exploring, as the replacement for Odysseus in this new parallel scenario 
was entirely in Lucan’s hands. He could have made Curio the one to convince the troops, 
someone with status roughly equivalent to Odysseus. He could have imported another historical 
character, a tactic he has had no qualms about elsewhere in the epic,
59
 either someone else with 
the weight of an Odysseus behind their name or a minor aristocrat known to have a position in 
Caesar’s army. Instead, Lucan chose to create his own character to replace one of the two 
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 1.388-391: “Such a shout went to the skies, as when the Thracian North wind has leaned upon the cliffs of Ossa, 
there is a sound when the oak of the pressed forest curves down, or when it returns back to the skies.” 
58 Odysseus’ speech (2.284) begins Ἀτρεΐδη νῦν δή σε ἄναξ, while Laelius calls Caesar Romani maxime rector 
nominis in his opening.  
59
 See, for example, the presence of Cicero at the battle of Pharsalia and his crucial speech to Pompey, 7.68-85. 
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greatest Greek heroes, at least in literary fame, who gives his speech with Athena by his side, and 
to make that character a common soldier who has been elevated but is common all the same.  
This is a form of generic play that Lucan toys with throughout his poem, taking 
traditional epic tropes and heroes and lowering them with the participation of common soldiers.
60
 
The comparison would seemingly elevate the depiction of a common soldier like Laelius up to 
that of an Odysseus figure, as someone who not only is capable of convincing an army to go to 
war where Caesar failed, but also worthy of an allusion to Odysseus. At the same time, however, 
as the common soldiery gets this notable visibility, we see that their one role in the Iliad, that of 
the Thersites figure who airs their complaints, is eliminated by Lucan. This may not be a bad 
thing for the representation of the common soldiers, as Thersites is hardly a positive figure, but it 
does remove their ability to voice their complaints and transfers hints of Thersites, who has no 
other equivalent outlet, upon Laelius, so far the only common soldier to receive a voice. Thus 
Laelius is both elevated by association with Odysseus and damned by shades of Thersites, a 
persuasive speaker who is nevertheless immoral and dangerous.         
At this point, Lucan has started to define the relationship between Caesar and his troops 
through a moment of discontent. The reader never truly doubts that Caesar will succeed or that 
the soldiers will kill fellow Romans in his name, but Lucan nevertheless takes the time at this 
early juncture to explore what convinces the common soldier to follow Caesar willingly. First he 
defines an unsuccessful strategy with Caesar’s speech, showing that feelings of camaraderie and 
disapproval of a potentially tyrannical Roman are not enough to incite civil war, and then 
emends the strategy to something he believes to be convincing with Laelius’ speech, namely this 
new moral system with Caesar at its head.  
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Now that Caesar’s tactics have been laid out, and laid out in a way that interacts with the 
very beginning of the epic tradition, it is only natural for our minds to turn to the hitherto silent 
Pompey and look for parallel treatment. Caesar and Pompey have been introduced, after all, as 
the two opposing forces in this civil war in Lucan’s exposition,61 and even if Caesar is painted as 
the aggressor, Pompey’s soldiers should have to be convinced to fight just like Caesar’s forces. 
Ancient historians as early as Herodotus made frequent use of the speech by a general to his 
troops, particularly before a major battle; Polybius goes so far as to assign these speeches their 
own technical term, parakleseis.
62
 Caesar and Polybius in particular were fond of pitting paired 
speeches of the two generals against each other, and by the Imperial period the highly rhetorical 
educational system of Lucan’s day was using military exhortations as deliberative exercises.63  
Even with the issue of motivation of the troops set aside, it would be expected for Lucan, having 
spent the past two hundred lines describing the start of Caesar’s journey, to look at Pompey’s 
initial situation and give him a reciprocal speech. 
Lucan does not turn immediately to the state of Pompey’s camp, however, and the rest of 
Book 1 passes without a glimpse of the other general or his army. By the time the second book 
starts, we have heard an ethnographic catalogue of Gauls, a description of the flight of the 
senators from Rome, a series of gruesome portents, and three predictions of the future from a 
seer, an augur, and a bacchanal. The action in the second book continues to take place in Rome, 
                                                     
61
 See, for example, Lucan’s first explicit image of the two generals, as the Aegean and Ionian seas held apart by the 
narrow isthmus of Corinth, otherwise known as Crassus, in lines 1.100-104: Qualiter undas/ qui secat et geminum 
gracilis mare seperat Isthmos/ nec patitur conferre fretum, si terra recedat,/ Ionium Aegaeo frangat mare. “Just like 
the slender isthmus which cuts the waves and divides the twofold sea and does not allow the water to come together, 
if the earth should recede, the Ionian sea would break the Aegean.” The two generals are here represented by 
roughly equal bodies of water, geminum mare, which are in reality part of the same whole; Lucan does not even 
specify which body of water represents which general.  
62
 See Hansen, 161-162 for an explanation of the importance of the general’s speech in historiography. 
63
 See Zoido, 154-155 for a discussion of Lesbonax of Mytilene’s speeches mimicking the battle exhortation.  
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where a number of civilians speak their laments, Brutus and Cato debate the merits of choosing a 
side in civil war, and Cato remarries a former wife. Our first narrative depiction of Magnus 
finally comes at 2.392, but Lucan only stays with the Pompeian army for a moment before 
embarking upon an extensive geographical digression that brings us back to Caesar’s march 
rather than Pompey’s. In his description of Caesar’s march Lucan takes the time to note the 
names of six Pompeian generals defeated by the Caesarian onrush
64
 before settling upon the 
story of Domitius, which he treats at some length in lines 2.478-525. In this episode, where 
Domitius attempts to prevent Caesar from reaching Corfinium by rerouting a river in his path but 
is handed over to the enemy by his own troops when their fate looks desperate,
65
 we actually 
hear two short speeches from the Pompeian subordinate, one urging his troops to stop Caesar and 
the second urging himself to suicide after Caesar has pardoned him.
66
  
It is not until Domitius’ episode has concluded that we finally come to Pompey himself at 
2.531, already in the midst of an engagement with Caesar, and hear his long-anticipated speech 
to his troops. This delay of Pompey’s voice for an entire book builds anticipation as we hear of 
his movements but never meet the man himself while the tales of each subordinate general grow 
in importance and length. At the same time, however, the delay somewhat diminishes Pompey’s 
importance and image of authority, as we get a full picture of the other elite men serving under 
Pompey and even hear one of them speak before he does. By contrast, the only other Caesarians 
introduced so far have been Curio, who gives advice to Caesar but makes no decisions on his 
own, and Laelius, the fanatical centurion. This gives the reader the consistent impression that 
Caesar is the only man with personal authority on his side of the civil war and falls in line with 
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 2.462-477. Lucan gives us the fates of Libo, Thermus, Sulla, Varus, Lentulus, and Scipio, with increasing 
attention paid to each.  
65
 The episode is mentioned by Caesar in BC I.17-20, where Domitius is given up by his troops only after they learn 
that he himself has lost hope; Lucan’s Domitius is steadfast in his defiance up through his suicide offstage.  
66
 The first speech is at 2.483-490; the second is 2.522-525.  
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the content of Laelius’ speech. In addition, Caesar is the first character we meet, both on the 
Caesarian side and in the epic as a whole, further elevating his importance. With Pompey, 
however, although he is at the pinnacle of an eight part crescendo of generals, he is still one of 
many, and he still has to wait until the second book to speak, after Caesar has already delivered 
four speeches. This literary tactic of Lucan’s reflects the historical Pompey’s political problems 
during the civil war, as the support of the Senate put too many competing voices in the Pompeian 
camp and, ironically enough, proved to be a hindrance rather than a help. 
When Pompey finally does give his speech to the troops asking for their support in the 
face of Caesar’s approaching army, he begins with an address to the ultores scelerum melioraque 
signa secuti and takes several lines to establish his army’s legitimacy according to the laws of 
Rome.
67
 He admits that they are at a disadvantage, having lost the first engagements, but 
maintains that those losses were what made their cause a moral one since their enemies were the 
ones to draw first blood. He draws on historical exempla from Rome’s recent past in an attempt 
to avoid classifying his actions as civil war: Neque enim ista vocari/ proelia iusta decet, patriae 
sed vindicis iram.
68
 As he continues, Pompey’s ad hominem attacks on Caesar increase in 
frequency and fervor, as does his inflation of his own image, and the speech ends with a twenty-
line litany of Pompey’s past victories against the various enemies of Rome before finally closing 
with the dubiously inspirational quod socero bellum praeter civile reliqui?
69
 Pompey, like 
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 2.531-533. The first three lines as a whole read, O scelerum ultores melioraque signa secuti,/ O vere Romana 
manus, quibus arma senatus/ non private dedit, votis deposcite pugnam, or “O avengers of crimes and followers of 
the better standards, O truly Roman band, to whom the senate gave arms that were not private, demand battle with 
vows.” 
68
 2.539-540. “For it is not right for these to be called just battles, but rather the anger of an avenging fatherland.” 
Roller notes that a bellum iustum, for which he thinks proelia iusta is a metrical variant, is specifically a war against 
a foreign hostis (“Ethical Contradiction,” 323).  
69
 2.595. “What have I left for my father-in-law except civil war?” Not only does this phrase put the blame for the 
civil war back on Pompey’s shoulders, even if uttered flippantly, but socero draws uncomfortable attention to the 
familial relationship of the two generals that should not be violated. 
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Caesar, fails to rouse a positive response from his troops, who neither shout nor demand battle, 
and he is forced to retreat. 
After waiting hundreds of lines, the reader has finally met Pompey and heard him speak, 
only to see him fail. Caesar’s first speech to his troops was equally ineffectual, even sharing 
some of the same pitfalls, but Lucan had already given him a successful speech against a goddess 
during his encounter with Roma at the Rubicon and the general was soon rescued by his primus 
pilus’ speech. Pompey, as Fantham notes, never seems weaker in the whole epic than he does 
here, failing to produce a successful piece of rhetoric and obsessing over his past victories in a 
way that only appears insecure.
70
 Apart from the ineffectual ad hominem attacks, a tactic that 
Caesar used to little effect as well, Pompey articulates a moral system that Roller calls the 
communitarian view, emphasizing the Romanitas of both his army and his enemy and viewing 
the civil war as an internal conflict within one large community.
71
 This can be demonstrated by 
Pompey’s insistent reminders that his army is the truly Roman one, the vere Romana manus, 
made all the more striking in comparison to Caesar’s parallel speech. Although Caesar accuses 
Pompey of tyranny and calls upon his troops to liberate the city from the autocrat, a strategy 
which Pompey echoes throughout his speech, Caesar never uses the word Romanus, preferring to 
skirt around the issue that two Roman armies are fighting with one another. Laelius’ speech is all 
the more effective precisely because it denies the supremacy of Rome and the soldiers’ 
identification as Roman citizens, replacing the entire notion with loyalty to Caesar instead. 
Pompey, on the other hand, uses the adjective Romanus three times in his speech
72
 and bases his 
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 Fantham, 32 and 526-609 n.  
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 See Roller, 323-324 for an exploration of the communitarian view within this speech. 
72
 At 2.532, Pompey addresses his troops as O vere Romana manus, or “O true Roman band,” at 2.564-565, he 
boasts, non privata cupis, Romana quisquis in urbe/ Pompeium transire paras, or “you do not desire to be a mere 
private citizen, whoever prepares to surpass Pompey in the Roman city,” and 2.580-582 he again boasts of his 
Romanitas: idem per Scythici profugum divortia ponti/ indomitum regem Romanaque fata morantem/ ad mortem 
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entire argument around the principle that he is the true Roman avenging the wrongs done to the 
state, the one who has always protected Rome against her enemies. At 2.541-549, in his attacks 
against Caesar Pompey compares his enemy to insubordinate Romans from recent history rather 
than foreign adversaries, calling Caesar a Catiline, Lentulus, Cethegus, Marius, Cinna, Lepidus, 
Carbo, and Sertorius, culminating with Spartacus at 2.554. Caesar, on the other hand, calls 
himself a Hannibal.
73
 While Pompey and Caesar approach their status as Romans very 
differently in their two speeches to the troops, both try to use a combination of ad hominem 
attacks and the notion of rescuing Rome from an oppressor to convince their troops to fight, and 
fail doing so. Pompey ultimately fails where Caesar does not because he has no Laelius figure to 
redefine a moral system for him and no Odysseus to convince his troops to fight on. 
The fact that Pompey lacks a Laelius or an Odysseus may initially come as a surprise to 
the reader, as Lucan’s parallels between Caesar and Pompey’s first speeches to their troops go 
beyond their content and poor reception. The episode with Pompey in Book 2 also hearkens back 
to the scene in the second book of the Iliad with Agamemnon, Odysseus, and Thersites, and not 
just through its connection with Caesar and Laelius in Book 1. Before Pompey begins his speech, 
Lucan opens the scene with iamque secuturo iussurus classica Phoebo/ temptandasque ratus 
moturi militis iras/ adloquitur tacitas veneranda voce cohortes.
74
 This, as Fantham notes, echoes 
Agamemnon as he prepares for his major attack but decides to test his troops with words first.
75
 
The circumstances are not identical, as Pompey speaks in earnest while Agamemnon hopes for a 
reaction opposite of what he says, but both use verbs of testing or trying to describe their actions. 
                                                                                                                                                                           
Sulla felicior ire coegi, or “again I, luckier than Sulla, forced the indomitable king, who had been delaying the fate 
of Rome, through the isthmus of the Scythian sea in flight to his death.” 
73
 Caesar’s comparison of Hannibal’s march to his own comes during his speech to his troops at 1.303-305.  
74
 2.527-530. “And now on the following day, he was about to order the trumpets and then thought the passion of the 
troops who were about to march should be tested, and he spoke to the cohorts, silent because of his voice which 
must be revered.”  
75
 See Fantham, 526-609 n. and Iliad 2.73, πρῶτα δ᾽ ἐγὼν ἔπεσιν πειρήσομαι. 
33 
 
After his speech has been given and he has no choice but to retreat, Pompey’s flight to 
Brundisium is described like that of a defeated bull, exiled to the forest, who regains his strength 
against tree trunks before returning and conquering his rival.
76
 The passage is clearly playing off 
the image in Georgics 3.225-236 of a defeated bull who is also described as an exile and 
sharpens his horns on trees in the woods,
77
 but it also reaches back even further to the Iliad once 
more, where Agamemnon, having finally mustered his troops and prepared for battle, is 
described, ἠΰτε βοῦς ἀγέληφι μέγ᾽ ἔξοχος ἔπλετο πάντων ταῦρος: ὃ γάρ τε βόεσσι 
μεταπρέπει ἀγρομένῃσι.78 Both Pompey and Agamemnon are transformed into bulls after their 
speeches: Agamemnon is a successful bull who is at the head of his herd, while Pompey is a bull 
who had been defeated in battle and is forced to flee to prepare himself for the next one. These 
echoes of Agamemnon are reinforced for Pompey by the fact that Pompey, like Agamemnon, is 
the leader of many powerful aristocrats who had once held imperium.
79
 Pompey even admits it 
himself in his speech: hinc consul uterque,/ hinc acies statura ducum est.
80
 His army of princes 
and hints of Agamemnon do him no good, however, since Pompey is doomed to watch his test 
fail while none of his aristocratic friends steps up and takes Odysseus’ role as Laelius did for 
Caesar. 
The portraits of Pompey and Caesar as painted by these two episodes, both in the words 
spoken and actions described, show Lucan’s pleasure in toying with the historical images of the 
two generals. The opening of Caesar’s speech with bellorum o socii, Roche notes, is an 




 In Lucan, the bull is described as an exul (603), and in the Georgics, he exulat (225); in Lucan, the bull in adversis 
explorat cornua truncis (603), and in the Georgics, irasci in cornua discit/ arboris obnixus trunco (232-233). 
78
 2.480-481. “Just as a bull stands out before all from the herd, for he is distinguished among the assembled oxen.”  
79
 Fantham (1985), 566 mentions the connection between Agamemnon and Pompey as leaders of armies of princes. 
80
 2.565-566. “Here is each consul, here the battle line of leaders will stand.” 
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acknowledgment of Caesar’s famous use of the word commilitiones with his troops.81 Suetonius 
claims that Caesar’s use of the word was successful and flattered his troops into submission, and 
yet this rhetorical tack of commonality and equality throughout the army is the one that Lucan 
quickly proves to be ineffectual. In fact, the strategy that Lucan suggests is the most effective, 
the elevation of the commander as far above the troops as possible as suggested by Laelius, is the 
polar opposite of the strategy the historical tradition ascribes to Caesar. It is almost as if Lucan 
acknowledges the strategy the historical Caesar is said to have used, lets his character Caesar 
behave in some ways like the historical Caesar, and then changes his behavior through Laelius 
into something Lucan prefers. 
These two opening interactions with the troops give the impression that Caesar, despite 
his rocky start, is on a better footing with his men going forward, while Pompey lacks their 
support. Pompey may now have the passionless advocacy of Cato and the slightly more 
enthusiastic support of Brutus after their debate earlier in Book 2, but he fails to connect with the 
common soldier on a motivational level. These images of Caesar the demagogue and Pompey the 
inspirationally lackluster leader are ones easily found in the historical tradition. Yavetz notes that 
Pompey’s attempts at popularity with the urban masses were never very successful,82 as Cassius 
Dio attests in his Historiae Romanae.83 In fact, Pompey was even depicted in contemporary 
rhetoric as the enslaver of the people, as Lucan’s Caesar does when he accuses him of tyranny at 
the end of his speech to the troops in Book 1.
84
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 Roche n. 299. See also Campbell, 33 for a discussion of Caesar’s commilitiones usage.  
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 Yavetz, 49. 
83
 Dio 41.6.1, φοβηθεὶς οὖν διὰ ταῦθ᾽ ὁ Πομπήιος ῾καὶ γὰρ εὖ ἠπίστατο ὅτι πολὺ τοῦ Καίσαρος, ἄν γε 
ἐπὶ τῷ δήμῳ γένωνται, “then Pompey was afraid about these things, for he knew well that he would be much 
inferior to Caesar, if it were put to the people.”                  
84
 Yavetz, 53. 
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Caesar’s appeal to the common people and Pompey’s lack thereof were also reflected in 
the composition of their armies, another fact that Lucan utilizes. Pompey’s plethora of 
aristocratic support has already been noted, with both consuls and Cato firmly at his side. Cicero 
wrote privately late in 50 BCE that Caesar’s supporters were all debtors, plebs, criminals, and the 
tribunes, and that no nobiles would join him in his camp.
85
 Cicero was wrong in the end, of 
course, as Caesar eventually gained support from Romans of all types, but Caesar nevertheless 
retained the favor of the lower classes and encouraged the heterogeneous composition of his 
constituency.
86
 While Lucan never explicitly discusses the class makeup of the two armies, he 
nevertheless gives us a sense through the types of characters who have spoken by the time that 
the speeches to the troops are given. After the list of all the Pompeian aristocratic generals who 
have fallen and the two short speeches from Domitius, the reader gets the firm sense that 
Pompey has a large support base of nobiles. The two Caesarians who speak, Curio and Laelius, 
are on opposite sides of the social spectrum, but as a tribune of the plebs and a centurion, both 
represent the lower classes in some sense and neither belong to the nobiles’ class.87  
In this first speech of Pompey’s, Lucan is able to acknowledge the epic tradition once 
more, draw comparisons between his two adversaries, and in doing so interact with the historical 
depictions of the two generals. If we turn back to focus on the general in question, however, we 
find that Lucan is making a point with his characterization of Pompey. This, as has been noted, is 
the first real time the audience interacts with Pompey as a character, and Lucan’s choice to make 
this first interaction be a dismal failure is a marked one. Lucan’s characterization of Caesar as a 
ruthless and bloodthirsty tool of fate leaves little room for sympathy, and like Brutus we are 
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 Cic. Att. 7.3.5.  
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 See Fucecchi, “Partisans in Civil War” for a fuller exploration of the types of supporters Pompey and Caesar each 
have in Lucan and their social classes and attitudes. 
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forced to concede to Cato, the moral voice of reason, and root for Pompey despite our 
uncomfortable prescience about the end of the story. When our first picture of Pompey is one of 
failure, however, it becomes that much harder to throw our support behind a losing horse in the 
reinforced knowledge that ultimately his fortunes will not change.  
Lucan gives Pompey the seeds of a potential solution to this dilemma out of his own 
mouth as he tries to console his soldiers about their recent losses. Di melius, he begins, belli 
tulimus quod damna priores:/ coeperit inde nefas, iam iam me praeside Roma/ supplicium 
poenamque petat. Neque enim ista vocari/ proelia iusta decet, patriae sed vindicis iram.
88
 
Pompey suggests that it is better for them to have suffered losses first, so that they can avenge 
wrongs done to their country rather than initiate conflict that can be seen as nefas. In Book 1, 
Laelius asks Caesar if it is really so terrible to conquer in civil war: usque adeo miserum est civili 
vincere bello? The allusion to Turnus’ speech noted previously makes the obvious answer a 
resounding yes in the minds of the audience, and we are clearly supposed to see Laelius’ moral 
system as flawed despite its easy instrumentation. In light of this, it is easy to extend Pompey’s 
assertion about the nefas of civil war and conclude that yes, it is so terrible to conquer in civil 
war, and, in fact, it is far superior morally to lose in civil war than to win. Pompey may not have 
a fanatical centurion ready to create a new moral system that excuses his actions, but his 
desperate grip on the old moral system makes him a nobler man even as his army fails him. His 
immediate failure as an orator and as a general makes Pompey a frustrating man to admire, but 
his conservative moral stubbornness redeems him as it damns him, a tragedy that resonates with 
readers. These two opening interactions between our major players and their troops, in 
accordance with their relation to the epic tradition, have served to define the characters of Caesar 
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 2.537-540. “It is better, gods, that we have borne the injuries of war first: let the impiety begin elsewhere, and 
now under my defense let Rome seek the punishment of suppliants. For it is not right for these to be called just 
battles, but rather the anger of an avenging fatherland.” 
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and Pompey as leaders against the foil of Agamemnon. When it comes to the common soldier, 
however, our lack of Thersites puts Lucan so far in a murky position. We have no contemptible 






Caesar Invictus: The Mutiny at Placentia 
 
So far, Lucan has explored the epic trope of an opening potential mutiny with Caesar, 
then expanded on it by creating a roughly parallel scene for Pompey. While he has spent more 
time on mutinies and speeches to the troops than any of his epic predecessors by expanding the 
initial mutiny into two scenes instead of one, his preoccupation can still be explained in typical 
epic terms and fits naturally into Lucan’s scheme of escalating epic tropes.89 When we reach 
Book 5, however, we find another mutinous situation, this time much closer to disaster for 
Caesar. The general and his army are returning to Italy (5.237), recently victorious in their 
campaign in Spain, when the troops decide that they have had enough and anonymously give 
Caesar a list of complaints, including long tours of service, their discomfort with civil war, old 
age, and lack of gratitude for their service. Caesar, however, is unafraid and replies with angry 
scorn, claiming that he has no need of their help and that it is the general who is important for 
victory, not the men beneath him. He addresses them as quirites and demands that the 
ringleaders be executed, which settles the issue.  
This event in Lucan, like the speech of Curio at Arminium, seems to be combining the 
two mutinies mentioned by Suetonius and later historians as examples of the few short-lived 
mutinies that Caesar suffered during the civil wars.
90
 The first was said to have happened at 
Placentia in the end of 49, when Caesar ordered the ninth legion to march to Brundisium and, 
from there, to more service in the East. The ninth had been in service for over a decade and 
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 Compare, for example, the structure of Lucan’s proem. Vergil’s introduction is 33 lines long, while Lucan’s is 66; 
Vergil is singing about arma virumque, two direct objects in comparison to the one in both the Iliad and the 
Odyssey, while Lucan has eight phrases as direct objects.  
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 These mutinies are attested in Suetonius Iul. 69-70, Appian 2. 47. 194 and 2. 93. 388-96, and Cassius Dio 41. 27-
35 and 42. 52-55.  
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refused to obey, presumably out of exhaustion; Caesar visited the mutinous camp and discharged 
them in disgrace, only allowing the immediately repentant soldiers back into service once he had 
punished the ringleaders.
91
 The other mutiny Lucan draws upon is the better known one near 
Rome in 47, where the legions, who were about to be sent to Africa, refused to go and threatened 
to attack the city instead. Caesar famously called the rebellious legions quirites, or citizens, and 
threatened to disband them; the soldiers, immediately cowed, insisted upon going to Africa with 
him, even though many were docked a third of their pay in punishment. Caesar the author 
unsurprisingly mentions neither event, but they are well enough attested as separate occurrences 
by later historians that Lucan appears to be once more tampering with history. Potential 
motivations are not hard to guess, since Lucan likely wanted to include the famous quirites 
address but was not planning on reaching that point in history in the scope of his epic. The fact 
remains, however, that Lucan made a point of combining two occurrences, neither of which 
appears in Caesar’s commentary, using the setting of one and the details of another.  
Book 5, believed by some to be the start of the second of three sections in Lucan’s 
proposed twelve book plan,
92
 opens with the two generals equal in standing:  
sic alterna duces bellorum volnera passos 





The action switches back and forth between the two generals as the book progresses and each 
leader faces his own challenges.
94
 The opening of the mutiny at 5.237 is the first we have seen of 
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 See Fantham (1985), 119-120 for a concise summary of the historical evidence for both this mutiny and the 
following one near Rome.  
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 See Ahl, 316-26 for an overview of the arguments over the reconstructed length of the epic, particularly 
concerning the death of Cato as the end point.  
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 5.1-3. “Thus Fortune preserved the leaders equally, having suffered wounds of war in turn in the lands of the 
Macedonians, mingling obstacles with successes.”  
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 The book begins with a makeshift senate meeting in Magnus’ camp (7-68), continues following the Pompeians as 
Arrius consults at Delphi (68-236), then switches over to Caesar and the mutiny (237-373), Caesar and his quelled 
troops at Brundisium (374-460), the meeting of the two forces (461-475), Caesar’s struggle with Antony (476-508), 
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Caesar’s troops since Curio’s disastrous defeat in Libya at the end of Book 4. Caesar himself has 
been absent since he accepted Afranius’ surrender at Ilerda over six hundred lines earlier and, 
despite the subsequent losses of his generals, he himself was last seen as munificent and in 
control. Lucan takes a moment after the battle has been won to mourn the plight of Caesar’s 
soldiers, who have to continue fighting despite the inevitability of Caesar’s success: ut numquam 
fortuna labet successibus anceps,/ vincendum totiens; terras fundendus in omnes/ est cruor et 
Caesar per tot sua fata sequendus.
95
 This image of a common soldier, predestined for terrible 
deeds and bullied into bloodshed by the force of the gerundive with no agency or visible 
presence in the sentence, is what Lucan challenges in the Book 5 mutiny.  
   When the mutiny begins in Book 5 and we finally turn to Caesar, Lucan immediately 
lets us know that the troops are no longer fighting without a say in the matter and that their 
general has a serious obstacle to overcome. Caesar, indomitable and fearless, has found 
something to fear, but within his own camp rather than on the battlefield,
96
 and Lucan admits that 
he is almost (paene) defeated by his own troops.  
haud magis expertus discrimine Caesar in ullo est, 
quam non e stabili tremulo sed culmine cuncta 




Despite Caesar’s eventual success at winning the loyalty of his troops in Book 1 and the 
narrator’s insistence that the troops are powerless in Book 4, the collective common soldiers are 
the ones who come the closest to stopping him, not Pompey or the senators at his back. In his 
                                                                                                                                                                           
Caesar’s brief sea journey and the subsequent mustering of his troops (509-721), before returning to Pompey and his 
decision to leave his wife on Lesbos (722-815). 
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 4.390-392. “Even if Fortune never wavered, unpredictable in her successes, so often they have to conquer; their 
blood must be spilled in every land, and they must follow Caesar through so much of his fate.” 
96
 5.240-242, nullo nam marte subactus/ intra castrorum timuit tentoria ductor/ perdere successus scelerum: “The 
leader feared, never subdued in battle, that he might lose the successes of his crimes among the tents of his camp.”   
97
 5.249-251. “Caesar was never taught more in any other crisis how he looked down from a height that was 
trembling, not stable, and how he stood supported above everything that was faltering.”  
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exposition Lucan acknowledges that non esse ducis strictos sed militis enses,
98
 but goes on to 
qualify that soldiers are usually bound by a net of mutual fear and keep whatever doubts they 
may have to themselves.
99
 The sheer size of the turba, however, dispelled their fears and allowed 
them to speak out and wield their collective power. The entire introductory passage is fraught 
with words of fear, as Caesar timuit… perdere successus scelerum,100 the troops no longer 
produced a pavidum… murmur,101 their reason for silence is explained as quisque pavet, quibus 
ipse timori est,
102
 and the size of the crowd metus exsolverat.
103
 When the speeches begin, 
however, Caesar alone suffers from fear and the troops, audax, protest confidently.  
  After a lengthy exposition, Lucan introduces the mutineers’ speech with two words, 
effudere minas.
104
 Effundo, whose primary meaning “to pour out,” is most often associated with 
liquids and was frequently used poetically by Vergil and other Augustan writers to dispense 
solids such as arrows and riders from horses’ backs.105 It also, however, had a range of other 
meanings that invoked images of multitudes and crowds. Historians used the verb in a middle 
sense to describe the movements of bodies of people,
106
 and as a participle with crowds of 
soldiers usually meant “scattered” or “dispersed.”107 The verb clearly refers to an act of speaking 
here, as it does in Cicero and elsewhere,
108
 but this choice of diction corroborates the plural 
verb’s insistence that a large, potentially unruly group of people are the ones making demands. 
                                                     
98
 5.254, “That swords, once drawn, belong not to the general, but to the soldier.” 
99
 5.256-259, nam quae dubias constringere mentes/ causa solet, dum quisque pavet, quibus ipse timori est,/ seque 
putat solum regnorum iniusta gravari,/ haud retinet: “for the cause which was accustomed to bind their doubtful 
minds no longer held them, that each was frightened by those to whom he himself was frightening, and he thought 










 5.261, “They poured out threats.” 
105
 See Aeneid 9.509 and 10.574. 
106
 See Caes. BC 2.7.3 and Liv. 26.19. 
107
 See Aeneid 6.305 and Liv. 30.5.8.  
108
 See Cic. de Or. 1.34.  
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The choice of minas rather than verba or some more neutral noun continues to articulate Lucan’s 
idea that fear is the predominant currency of the soldiers’ interpersonal relationships, both among 
each other and with their commander; the fact that the mutineers feel they can make threats in 
the first place also emphasizes the power that they have seized. To utilize this empowerment, 
however, the soldiers are forced to trade their individual identity. Unlike Laelius in Book 1 or 
even Thersites in the Iliad, the speaker of the coming speech is not named because, as Lucan just 
told us, the soldiers only get their power of complaint from their strength in numbers. To wield 
their collective power and voice their private thoughts, the mutineers have given themselves over 
to anonymity. 
 For a rowdy group of fearless soldiers, the mutineers begin their threats with a 
surprisingly polite request: liceat discedere, Caesar,/ a rabie scelerum.
109
 Already we see the 
soldiers rebelling against Laelius’ moral order, which effectively eliminated the problem of 
scelus by claiming that everything Caesar ordered was ius. Although they had previously agreed 
that it was not so bad to conquer in civil war, the soldiers now seem to have had a change of 
heart. These protests against civil war as a general evil continue as the mutineers protest with a 
marked one line sententia: tot mihi pro bellis bellum civile dedisti.
110
 The soldiers come back to 
this type of argument as they weave through their speech, complaining of committing nefas
111
 
and insisting that Caesar is forcing them to perform deeds although he was well aware of their 
moral qualms.
112
 The mutineers even go so far as to use this language to justify their current 
behavior, which defies the very heart of the system they were following under Laelius: nec fas 
                                                     
109
 5.261-262, “Let it be permitted, Caesar, for us to depart from the madness of crimes.” 
110
 5.269, “You gave me civil war as a reward for so many wars.” 
111
 5.272, imus in omne nefas manibus ferroque nocentes: “Committing the deepest nefas in every way with hands 
and with swords.” 
112
 5.284-285, quid velut ignaros ad quae portenta paremur spe trahis: “Why do you drag us with hope as if we are 
unaware for which omens we are being prepared.” 
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nec vincula iuris/ hoc audere vetant.
113
 The mutineers continually use this strict moral language 
as their defense in the midst of their other arguments, as if to make up for their disregard for it in 
the past.  
These other arguments range from nods to the various threads of the historiographical 
tradition to other responses to Laelius to emotionally charged death scenes. The first 
historiographical justification for their mutiny as put forward by Suetonius, namely that the 
soldiers were tired from years of fighting, is acknowledged early on in Lucan’s speech in a list of 
previous Caesarian deaths, and then gets a fuller treatment at 5.274-284.
114
 The mutineers urge 
Caesar to observe all the physical evidence of their old age before asking him to release them so 
they can die in peace. They then launch into a stirring depiction of lonely death on the battlefield 
as they bemoan their last breath with their helmets still on, the lack of a wife to mourn them, and 
the necessity of a shared funeral pyre, proving that, despite their collective lower class status, the 
mutineers are competent rhetoricians who can protest a lack of individuality in death.  
The other justification from historiography, this time from Livy, is that the soldiers 
secretly wanted to sack Rome and felt that their greed was unsatisfied,
115
 which unsurprisingly 
finds its way into Lucan’s speech as well. Cepimus expulso patriae cum tecta senatu, they 
complain, quos hominum vel quos licuit spoliare deorum?
116
 This complaint, though a testament 
to their alleged greed, also reveals another point of contention that links back to the renewal of 
their belief in a moral code outside of Caesar’s wishes. The soldiers, though apparently once 
willing to burn Rome to the ground, seem to have rediscovered their allegiance to Rome, again in 
defiance of Laelius’ speech in Book 1. The seizure of the city appears to have been a deed that 
                                                     
113
 5.288-289, “Neither righteousness nor the chains of our oath forbid us to dare this.” 
114
 5.264-269.  
115
 See Fantham (1985), 120 for a discussion of the reconstructed treatment of the episode in Livy.  
116
 5.270-271, “When we seized the roofs of our homeland, after the Senate had been expelled, who of men and of 
the gods were we permitted to despoil?”  
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required considerable compensation, perhaps because they realized that it was not covered by a 
usual soldier’s duties. When they ask quid satis est, si Roma parum est, the mutineers again 
imply that the sacking of Rome was a deed that could not be surpassed, and by extension a 
wrong that perhaps should not have been committed.
117
   
Following their list of complaints, the soldiers try to justify their behavior, and their 
previously oblique references to questions of moral codes become explicit. After the mutineers 
insist that neither fas nor their military oath has the right to prevent the mutiny, they go on to 
explain, Rheni mihi Caesar in undis/ dux erat, hic socius; facinus, quos inquinat, aequat.
118
 
Apart from the word play, this phrase is also a direct confrontation of the moral strategy of 
Caesar and Laelius. Caesar is effective precisely because he is a dux set above the rest, and his 
proposal that the entire army be socii with him from the opening of his speech in Book 1 was an 
utter failure.
119
 The mutineers may be consciously mocking Caesar, although historically 
speaking the troops Caesar spoke to at Arminium were not the troops that mutinied at Placentia, 
but whether intentional or not, this reminder of Caesar’s failed moral system has virtually the 
same effect on the reader, who cannot help but notice that Caesar’s troops are using his own 
words against him.  
As the mutineers’ speech nears its end, the soldiers at last unknowingly deal with Lucan’s 
assertion from Book 4 that Fortuna and Caesar are ultimately in control of their lives. Their final 
complaint is that quidquid gerimus, fortuna vocatur, claiming that they have not received the 
credit they deserve for Caesar’s accomplishments.120 This conscious claim of agency is followed 
by an even more decisive insistence on the common soldier’s importance: Nos fatum sciat esse 
                                                     
117
 5.2274, “What is enough, if Rome is too little?” 
118
 5.289-290, “Caesar was my commander at the Rhine, here he is my equal associate; crime makes equals 
whomever it stains.”  
119
 See Hardie, 7 for a discussion of the opposition of dux and miles in Lucan, following in the footsteps of Ovid and 
Livy.  
120
 5.292, “Whatever we accomplish, it is said to be Fortune.” 
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suum. Licet omne deorum/ obsequium speres, irato milite, Caesar,/ pax erit.
121
 After turning the 
assumption that the soldiers’ fates are led by Caesar on its head, the mutineers deride Caesar’s 
alleged connection to the gods before invoking a new element in the equation: peace. The 
soldiers have previously asked for the opportunity to retire and implied that they were 
uncomfortable with Caesar’s methods, but this is the first (and last) time they have mentioned a 
complete cessation of hostilities. Pax, and pax deorum in particular, is conventionally a goal to 
be strived for,
122
 but the soldiers know Caesar well enough to recognize that peace is something 
their general only dreams about in nightmares. Contrary to the wishes of Caesar, this pax is 
ultimately what Lucan and his Roman audience hope for, and Lucan tells us before the episode 
even begins that the soldiers almost achieve it; we know in our heart of hearts that Caesar is in 
fact destined by the course of history to succeed, but we believe, as the soldiers do in this 
moment, that the common soldiers of Caesar’s army together have enough power to stop the war. 
Lucan does not allow the mutiny to stop the war, as he admits once the speech is done, but he 
ends the section with the decisive line, finem civili faciat discordia bello.
123
 
Any other general would be terrified in the face of the tumultus before him, Lucan 
acknowledges, but not Caesar. Despite the defiant conclusion of the mutineers’ speech, Caesar 
trusts the power of his fate and rejoices in the opportunity to face the danger of mutiny. The only 
thing Caesar fears is the possibility that his soldiers will regain sound minds, and he is happy, the 
narrator acknowledges, to ignore his soldiers’ request and force them to perform deeds they 
would otherwise be unwilling to undertake.
124
 When Caesar finally speaks, he is non metuens, 
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 5.293-295, “Let him know that we are his fate. Although you hope for every obedience, Caesar, there will be 
peace of the gods with the anger of the soldier.”  
122 For the special significance of pax deorum, see, for example, Livy 3 5.14, where in response to terrible omens in 
the sky, omnia delubra pacem deum exposcentium virorum mulierumque turba implebantur, “All the temples were 
filled with crowds of men and women praying for the peace of the gods.” 
123





like the mutineers before him, and, regardless of whatever Lucan has told us about Caesar’s fears 
in the past, he is now driven by anger.
125
  
Lucan’s entire description of the mutiny is filled with anger, an emotion that is both 
stereotypical and problematic for both sides of the mutiny. The historical Caesar was famous for 
his clementia towards his enemies, which was so great that it arguably caused his death,
126
 and 
Sallust even has his Caesar condemn public officials who display iracundia during the 
Catilinarian debate.
127
 Lucan chooses to discard this historical impression in favor of a ruler who 
rages at his subjects, as Caesar begins his speech to his troops ira dicante.
128
 The mutineers 
ended their speech, as we have seen, threatening the consequences of their own anger: irato 
milite, Caesar,/ pax erit.
129
 Caesar picks up on this promise of anger in the first line of his speech 
in response: qui modo in absentem voltu dextraque furebas,/ miles.
130
  Conventional Republican 
wisdom puts Caesar the angry Roman officer in the wrong,
131
  but the anger of the troops is more 
difficult to decipher without simply writing it off as the product of the rabies that comes with a 
crowd, a stereotype Caesar takes advantage of going forward.132 Even if the mutineers display a 
stereotypical show of anger, which is tempered by their promise of peace, Caesar’s even more 
unseemly display plays on Imperial Roman fears of an emperor’s unbridled anger.133 Although it 
is difficult to side with a raving crowd, the fact that Caesar responds to their anger with anger of 
his own puts him even more deeply in the wrong as soon as his speech begins.      




 See Harris, 243 for a discussion of Caesar’s clementia and its relationship to iracundia. See also Dio 38 11.3-5 
for the later historian’s view on Caesar’s lack of anger even while meting out harsh punishments.  
127






 5.319-320, “You, soldier, who was recently raging against an absent man with your face and with your hand.” 
131
 Angry heroes were, however, slightly more acceptable in the genre of epic. Consider the anger of Achilles – 
arguably the central theme of the Iliad – or the more problematic anger of Aeneas at the end of the Aeneid, which is 
explored in Harris, 246-247. 
132
 De ira ii.34.1, “It is dangerously volatile to contend with an equal, mad to contend with a superior, and vile to 
contend with an inferior.” 
133
 See Harris, 253-254 on the Imperial Roman fear of the tyrannical anger of the Julio-Claudians. 
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Although the mutineers waited until the end of their speech before bringing up the issues 
of dux, socius, and miles as their tour de force, Caesar wastes no time before asserting his 
dictatorial dominance over the troops. After the line accusing them of rage, Caesar opens his 
second line with a shaming address to the singular miles, reinforcing Laelius’ moral schema.134 
The powerful crowd of mutineers has already been cowed into a singular soldier, stripped of 
their power in a single word, and Caesar is quick to assert himself as a dux invictus four lines 
later. He almost immediately gives two blunt one line commands in the imperative, one singular 
and one plural, scornfully ordering his former troops to hic fuge, si belli finis placet, ense 
relicto,
135
 and vadite meque meis ad bella relinquite fatis.
136
 For all their firm demands, the 
mutineers spoke respectfully to Caesar, never once using an imperative; Caesar, in his 
confidence, never hesitates to order the men like the soldiers they were. Caesar’s favorite point, 
slightly less emphasized than the mutineers’ invocation of morality, is his assertion of the gods’ 
investment in his cause. This comes first as a direct rebuttal to the soldiers’ claim that they 
control his fate, as he asks, an vos momenta putatis/ ulla dedisse mihi? numquam sic cura 
deorum/ se premet, ut vestrae saluti/ fata vacent.
137
 Caesar returns to this idea and the assertion 
of his superiority when he insists that procerum motus haec cuncta secuntur;/ humanum paucis 
vivit genus,
138
 before claiming loftily that the gods, who are on his side, must wish for him to 
acquire new troops and are dismissing the old ones willingly.
139
 In these repeated reminders, 
Caesar is combating his troops’ assertion that they are all equal and liable to their crimes with a 
                                                     
134
 5.320.  
135
 5.321, “Flee from here, if the end of the war pleases you, once you have left behind your sword.” 
136
 5.325, “Go and leave me behind with my fates to war.” 
137
 5.339-342, “Do you think that you have given any importance to me? The concern of the gods will never oppress 
itself so much, that the fates will be idle enough for your safety.” 
138 5.342-343, “All these things follow the movements of the leading men; the human race lives for the sake of the 
few.” 
139
 5.351-353.  
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reiteration of Laelius’ moral strategy, placing himself firmly on top of the moral ladder by the 
will of the gods. 
On a larger scale, Caesar’s speech is essentially a bluff wrapped in reverse psychology. 
He uses both of his imperative orders to command the troops to abandon the war, the precise 
opposite of what Caesar truly wants, despite his boasts that he can easily find another army to 
finish the job. Caesar’s stirring image of old age is not of a tired soldier dying alone on a 
battlefield, but of a feeble ex-soldier, merely a part of the plebs Romana, watching as another 
army marches in Caesar’s triumph.140 This scornful classification as the plebs Romana may have 
subtly evoked Caesar’s famous quirites address for a Roman reader, still unaware that Lucan is 
playing with the historical record and combining this mutiny at Placentia with the later mutiny in 
Rome, and certainly mocks the troops’ newly rediscovered loyalty to Rome over Caesar. The 
speech, however, reaches its climax with a direct answer to the mutineers’ original request to 
discedere: discedite castris,/ tradite nostra viris ignavi signa quirites.
141
 Once again, Lucan gives 
Caesar an imperative ostensibly encouraging the troops to leave, replying to their demands with 
a surprising affirmative. By the time Caesar describes their mutiny as a rabies, an echo of the 
mutineers’ first request to be released a rabie scelerum, and commands the ringleaders to submit 
to punishment, the soldiers are utterly defeated and offer themselves for execution without 
protest. The soldiers, once so confident, fall for Caesar’s bluff and let go of their power of their 
own volition.  
Unlike the soldiers of Agamemnon, Caesar’s mutineers are deeply affected by his reverse 
psychology, effective not so much in its logical persuasive arguments, of which there are few, 
but rather in its deep shaming. Laelius, too, used shame rather than logic to convince the soldiers 




 5.357-358, “Leave the camps, cowardly citizens, and give my standards back to men. 
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to follow Caesar in the first place, not even bothering to employ direct address. Our four 
examples of speeches to soldiers so far – Caesar’s first attempt, Laelius’ correction, Pompey’s 
failed attempt and Caesar’s decisive second try – suggest that typical Roman logic will never be 
an effective motivation for a soldier to participate in civil war: unless scelus can be redefined, no 
logical argument will be able to combat it.                     
Once Caesar is done with them, the troops give up their mutiny and become a singular 
frightened entity once more, as befits a group whose power came from their numbers. After 
Caesar’s speech finishes, tremuit saeva sub voce minantis/ volgus iners, unumque caput tam 
magna iuventus/ privatum factura timet, velut ensibus ipsis/ imperet invito moturus milite 
ferrum.
142
 The troops have become a singular volgus, and even a singular iuventus, and this time 
it is Caesar who is uttering the threats (minantis) in stark contrast to the group of men who, 
plural, effudere minas.  The narrator’s aphorism that non esse ducis strictos sed militis enses is 
turned on its head. The soldiers are, in accordance with the epic tradition as set down by Homer 
and Vergil, described in the same terms as the storm soon to come in Book 5, and like the storm 
they are cowed by the force of Caesar’s personality and the weight of his fate.143 Despite their 
assertion that they control his fate, after a brief moment of uncertainty soldiers and readers alike 
are forced to accept that Caesar is truly a force that cannot be stopped. 
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 5.364-367, “The helpless crowd trembled beneath the voice of the man threatening them, and such great young 
manhood feared a single man, although they were about to make him a private citizen, as if he could command their 
swords themselves, about to set the iron in motion though the soldier was unwilling.” 
143
 See Fantham (1985), 122 for a chart of the correspondences between the mutinous soldiers and the storm.  
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Chapter Three  
Cato’s Inheritance: The Mutiny in Libya 
 
Our final outburst from the troops comes in the first half of Book 9 against Cato, a new 
military player after the death of Pompey. This mutiny appears at the beginning of the end, the 
start of the final third of the theoretical twelve book plan. Cato has been absent from the 
narrative since he threw his support behind Pompey in Book 2, but he reappears almost 
immediately after Pompey’s death as a literal inheritor of Pompey’s spirit.144 Although Cato had 
hated Magnus for his tyrannical leanings while alive and had only pledged his support to the 
Pompeian faction out of loyalty to the senate, post Thessalicas clades iam pectore toto/ 
Pompeianus erat.
145
 The remainder of Pompey’s post-Pharsalian army, however, is loyal to 
Pompey exclusively, not to a larger cause, and so when their leader’s funeral has finished, his 
soldiers prepare to give up their standards and flee. The Cilician king Tarcondimotus leads the 
way, but Cato halts his progress with a few disdainful words. The mutineer’s speech comes 
instead from a nameless member of the discontented crowd, who politely informs the new 
general that they fight for Pompey, not for Rome, before leading a rush for the ships parallel to 
the Iliad. It takes an impassioned speech from Cato, full of shame, admonition, and sarcastic 
calls for even greater crimes, to turn the ships around and convince the men to keep fighting. 
Cato, like Caesar in Book 5, is successful in quelling his mutiny, though it is the closest call yet.      
 If we extend our scope of inquiry beyond the mutiny itself, we see that Cato has 
essentially been in dialogue with Pompey’s troops since his eulogy at Pompey’s funeral at line 
                                                     
144
 9.17-18, et scelerum vindex [manes Pompei] in sancto pectore Bruti/ sedit et invicti posuit se mente Catonis, 
“And the spirit of Pompey, the avenger of crimes, settled in the sacred breast of Brutus and placed itself in the 
unconquered mind of Cato.” Note that even though Cato is seemingly influenced by the spirit of Pompey, he is still 
invictus.   
145
 9.23-24, “After the slaughter in Thessaly, now he was entirely Pompeian in his heart.” 
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188 and continues to interact with them, with a few notable digressions, up until the end of their 
march across the Syrtes at line 937. Cato gives a funeral oration, the troops stir with mutiny, 
Cato gives a brief rebuke, the mutineer gives his speech, and Cato replies with a lengthy speech 
of his own, a one hundred line exchange where Lucan gives Cato three separate addresses to the 
troops. There is a lengthy geographical digression describing the harshness of the region they are 
about to face, but as soon as the narrative returns to Cato at 371 he gives yet another speech to 
the troops, this time to encourage them to march across the barren sands. After they respond 
positively, Lucan launches into another lengthy description of the harsh climate and the suffering 
of the troops within it, but Cato’s voice is back soon enough, rebuking a soldier who tries to offer 
him a drink of water. Following the discovery of a temple and a brief debate between Labienus 
and Cato over the benefits of knowing the future, still technically a conversation between Cato 
and a subordinate, Lucan gives us a detailed description of Cato’s interaction with the troops as 
they all suffer together at 587, punctuated by yet another brief speech from Cato to his troops 
about the safety of the drinking water.  
 In spite of all of Cato’s speeches to the soldiers, we have to wait until line 848 for the 
soldiers to finally speak again, and despite the narrator’s earlier assurance of their newfound 
willingness to cross the desert,
146
 they do not have particularly positive things to say. This is, of 
course, after the infamous snake passage, and Lucan’s readers have just been subjected to a 
catalogue of soldier names, snake species, and gory deaths. The soldiers, plural yet speaking as 
one, beg the gods saepe to return them to the horror of Pharsalia, as they are intruding upon a 
serpentine realm harsher than civil war. Cogit tantos tolerare labores/ summa ducis virtus, Lucan 
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 9.406-408: Sic ille paventes/ incendit virtute animos et amore laborum,/ inreducemque viam deserto limite carpit, 
“Thus he kindled their fearful spirits with virtue and a love of labors, and, having left the boundary behind, seized 
the path from which there would be no return.”  
52 
 
notes, and yet their toleration is grudging at best.
147
 After Caesar quells his mutiny in Book 5, his 
troops never complain again and, apart from their assent before Pharsalia, have very little further 
presence in the epic. Cato, however, is continually talking with the troops that slowly become 
his. After the march finishes, Cato disappears from the rest of the extant poem, and while some 
speculate that he would have come back to make one more stand before his suicide at the end of 
Book 12, his actions in Book 9 are almost entirely defined by his interaction with the common 
soldiers. The mutiny against him in lines 215-294 cannot be taken as a standalone event, 
therefore, but as a pivotal moment in Cato’s development as a leader of Pompey’s men.  
   Cato, the perfect exemplum of a Republican hero, has no interest in partisanship or one 
man rule. Although he advises Brutus to join Pompey’s side rather than stay aloof from the 
fighting in Book 2, he strongly objects to the admission of the mutineer that the army fights for 
Pompey instead of for Rome. Despite his often expressed distaste for autocrats at the heads of 
armies,
148
 Cato steps forward and becomes one himself as soon as he delivers Pompey’s funeral 
oration. After his death, Pompey undergoes metempsychosis, perhaps echoing the stories of 
Caesar’s apotheosis after his own murder, but the vindex scelerum is soon put in its place by 
Cato’s eulogy. The first two words of Cato’s speech, civis obit, make it clear that Pompey was 
merely a man, and while civis may be a higher compliment than dux coming from the mouth of 
Cato, it still places Pompey on the same level as every other Roman citizen.
149
 The rest of the 
speech is hardly a ringing endorsement; Cato carefully balances Pompey’s strengths and 
weaknesses in both content and structure, with such lines as iuvit sumpta ducem, iuvit dimissa 
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 9.881-882: “The outstanding virtue of their leader compelled them to tolerate such great labors.” 
148
 See, for example, the opening of book nine, where Lucan notes, [Cato], ubi pendebant casus dubiumque 
manebat,/ quem dominum mundi facerent civilia bella,/ oderat et Magnum, quamvis comes isset in arma/ auspiciis 
raptus patriae ductuque senatus, or “While the fates were hanging in the balance doubt remained, whom civil war 
would make the master of the world, Cato hated Pompey also, although he went with him as a comrade in arms, 
seized by the auspices of the country and the generalship of the Senate” (9.19-22).   
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 Cato ends his litany of mixed praise with the benefits of Pompey’s condition in such 
a time and at the very last turns the speech towards himself. The et mihi at the beginning of his 
first sentence (212) emphasizes this, and Cato goes on to note that non deprecor hosti/ servari, 
dum me servet cervice recisa.
151
 Not only does this turn of rhetoric encourage the soldiers to 
imagine Cato in Pompey’s place, but it serves as one of the many reminders of Cato’s upcoming 
suicide that haunt the text for the readers and draws yet more attention to Cato as the new figure 
to watch. Lucan maintains once the speech is done that Cato brought greater honor to Pompey in 
his eulogy than the deceased general could have ever hoped to receive while praised at the 
Rostra, but after the considerable emphasis on Pompey’s faults, it is hard for readers not to turn 
to Cato as a better solution for the Republican cause. 
 Cato is now the next leader to take up the Republican cause, the recipient of Pompey’s 
inheritance. The implications of that remark, obvious as it may be, are worth exploring. We have 
already seen that Pompey could not stand up to Caesar in any significant way, despite their 
seemingly equal and opposite status. Caesar’s side has not won every battle, but when the two 
generals were face to face, Caesar always triumphed. We have also already seen how Caesar 
completely overwhelmed Pompey in his control over the troops; although it took him a failed 
speech before he found success, Caesar is able to assert complete supremacy over his troops in 
Book 5, while Pompey has no such luck in his parallel speech in Book 2 and is continually 
bullied by his technical subordinates.
152
 Cato is put forward, both by the narrator and by his own 
speech, as the new and improved leader of Pompey’s faction, but with that responsibility comes 
the assumption that he will be the single man in charge of an army, Caesar’s new equal and 
opposite. This authority and semi-heroic status gives Cato the very power he so despised in 
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 9.200, “Power taken up was pleasing to the leader, and power sent away was pleasing as well.”  
151
 9.213-214. “I would not beg to be preserved for my enemy, Caesar, while he preserved me with my head cut off.” 
152
 See, for example, Pompey and Cicero before Pharsalia, where Cicero essentially forces him into action. 
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Pompey and makes the denouncer of autocrats similar to Caesar on some level. Cato insults the 
dux, the rector, and the rex and is held up in the minds of the readers as the Republican ideal, 
and yet he has to step into the shoes of a Pompey or a Caesar when it falls to him to convince the 
troops to stay and fight. In fact, when the mutinous soldier begins his speech and addresses it to 
Cato, he conpellat regentem,
153
 while Cato had rebuked Pompey for being a rector senatus a 
mere thirty lines earlier.
154
 When Cato begins his speech in reply, Lucan speaks of the voces 
ducis.
155
 As soon as Cato takes it upon himself to confront the troops and engage in this 
dialogue, he steps into Pompey’s shoes, and while historians call Pompey’s side the Republicans, 
Lucan never refers to them as anything other than the Pompeians.  
 The troops seem to concur with Lucan’s assessment, since the soldiers decide to abandon 
camp a mere sentence after Cato’s speech is done despite Cato’s subtle assumption of the 
Pompeian mantle. Fremit interea discordia volgi, Lucan begins, castrorum bellique piget post 
funera Magni.
156
 This language of the volgus and the murmurs it makes when discontented are 
common in Lucan and indirectly echo the crowd of Caesarian soldiers upset by Caesar’s 
unsuccessful speech in Book 1: non claro murmure volgus/ secum incerta fremit.
157
 Their 
reasoning, that the soldiers were tired of camps and war after Pompey’s funeral, seems 
straightforward enough, but the phrase post funera Magni could be interpreted in two ways. The 
first is corroborated by the later speech of the mutineer, and takes funera Magni metaphorically 
to mean Pompey’s death. The soldiers were only fighting for Pompey, and now that he is gone 
they have no reason to endure camp life or warfare. The second takes a more literal interpretation 
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 9.226. Rego, the verb meaning “to rule,” was an extremely loaded word in the minds of Romans, and carried 
heavy connotations of tyranny.  
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 9.217-128. “Meanwhile discord of the crowd murmured, and camps and wars were wearisome after the funeral of 
Pompey.” 
157
 1.352-353, “The crowd muttered uncertainties to itself in an unclear murmur.” The crowd Vergil describes in his 
simile of the winds is a volgus as well. 
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of funera Magni, and assumes that Lucan is talking about the funeral rites themselves. Cato’s 
speech has just concluded the funeral three lines before, and while there is no causal relationship 
implied by interea, it seems at least possible that it was Cato’s speech on top of the death of their 
beloved commander that contributed to the discontent. If we can accept a hint of this reading, 
then we again have a connection to the mutiny in Book 1, one that further associates Cato with 
the hated Caesar: both leaders give speeches about Pompey which are met with discontented 
rumblings from the crowd, and another lengthy speech is required before the soldiers express 
their approval.  
 After a brief exchange with Tarcondimotus, Cato looks at omnes/ in coetu motuque viros, 
and quorum unus aperta/ menta fugae tali conpellat voce regentem.
158
 Although Lucan uses a 
potential crowd word in coetu, this is overall an extremely humanizing portrayal of a crowd that 
was just recently a singular volgus. Cato sees omnes viros, who are collected together and in 
motion, but clearly made up of individuals. Unlike the mutiny in Book 5, in this scene we have 
an unnamed soldier singled out as the voice of the army’s complaints, which the wording 
quorum unus makes unmistakable. Laelius was a relatively common soldier with a voice and an 
individual speech, a character who shares further similarities with this unnamed mutineer, but 
this is the first time we see the spokesperson of a mutinous crowd as a physical person, even if he 
is unnamed. He even goes so far as to physically lead the movement onto the ships as an 
independent agent once he finishes speaking, reaching all the way back to the flight to the ships 
in the Iliad for parallels.  
 This mutineer speaks out and justifies their desertion by invoking the civil war strategy of 
Laelius, claiming that now that Pompey has died, the soldiers have nothing to fight for. The 
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 9.223-224, “All the men in a gathering and in motion, one of whom, with a mind open to flight, addressed the 
ruler with such a speech.” 
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mutineer’s speech opens plainly with his central argument: Nos, Cato, -- da veniam – Pompei 
duxit in arma,/ non belli civilis amor, partesque favore/ fecimus.
159
 This is, of course, the heart of 
Laelius’ argument as well, who tells his commander that he would gladly obey any order so long 
as Caesar is giving it. One of the Book 9 mutineer’s more pithy lines comes near the end of his 
speech at 9.248, where he insists that Pompeio scelus est bellum civile perempto,/ quo fuerat 
vivente fides.
160
 This again encapsulates the precise point of much of Laelius’ content, as the 
centurion spends much of his time describing terrible acts of civil war he will perpetrate, no 
longer objectionable because they are undertaken out of a sense of fides.
161
 Laelius’ argument is 
underpinned by the assumption that Caesar is a man who should be elevated above all other men, 
which Caesar himself takes up more explicitly in his speech against the mutineers in Book 5. 
Cato, as we have seen, fights against this image of the near-holy autocrat in his funeral oration 
for Pompey, insisting that Pompey is simply a dead citizen who is now gone, but the mutineer 
seems to preserve some of this Laelian worship of his commander despite his death. In lines 240-
242, he insists that the greatest honor will be furnished for the sacris umbris, reinforcing the 
prior image of Pompey as a venerable shade whose wishes should be heeded, and goes on to 
assert that he will have nullum ducem but Pompey, even if he is forced to obey another master. 
This elevation of the dux is very much in line with the speeches of both Laelius and Caesar and 
continues to extend this technique of crowd management through most of Lucan’s epic.   
Although our nameless speaker echoes Laelius and by extension Book 5’s Caesar in his 
overarching message, he also bears significant resemblance to the Book 5 mutineers in the 
specific forms of his complaints, if not always in content. Both speeches begin surprisingly 
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 9.227-229, “Pompey led us, Cato, – grant us pardon – into arms, not a love of civil war: we made factions with 
his favor.” 
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 “Civil war is a crime now that Pompey has been killed, which was faith while he was alive.” 
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 See particularly 1.373-374: Nec civis meus est, in quem tua classica, Caesar,/ audiero, “Nor is he my fellow 
citizen, against whom I hear your trumpets sound, Caesar.” 
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politely for mutineers’ speeches: the Book 5 mutineers ask Caesar liceat discedere,162 while the 
Book 9 mutineer asks Cato to da veniam.
163
 Both mutineers talk about peace as a precious 
quality in direct opposition to their commander: the Book 5 mutineers end their speech with a 
threat that the soldiers will bring peace against Caesar’s will, while the Book 9 mutineer opens 
with a description of Pompey as the man quem paci praetulit orbis.
164
 They also, unsurprisingly, 
share a desire to go home and see their loved ones and spend a considerable time begging for 
deaths of old age.
165
 Although these are not particularly revolutionary similarities, considering 
the nature of the mutineers’ situations, the fact remains that despite their polar opposite 
ideological viewpoints – one group of soldiers is rebelling against the cause of following one 
man, while the other is mourning its loss – the mutineers ultimately have the same goals and 
echo one another in their speeches. This gives the Book 9 mutineer the peculiar position of 
representing both Caesar and his mutineers from the scene in Book 5, which leads us naturally to 
our next question: what about Cato? If the mutineer has verbal echoes of both an autocrat and a 
revolutionary, where does that leave the one man they are rebelling against? 
When Cato begins his second speech to the troops, he uses what seems to be the obvious 
tactic for a moral Republican man and points out the mutineers’ misguided sense of loyalty: ergo 
pari voto gessisti bella, iuventus,/ tu quoque pro dominis, et Pompeiana fuisti,/ non Romana 
manus?
166
 This iuventus plays off of the conflation of singular and plural that characterized the 
single speaker for the crowd thirty lines earlier; a singular noun, iuventus could either refer to a 
specific singular youth, or to a group of young men forced into a single unit, as it does when 
Lucan describes Caesar’s cowed troops as a single entity in Book 5. Thus for the first half of 






 9.229, “whom the world preferred to peace.” 
165
 See 5.281-282 and 5.274-277; in comparison see 9.230-231 and 9.234-236. 
166
 9.256-257, “Therefore have you waged war with an equal vow, young men, did you also fight for your master, 
and were you a Pompeian band, not a Roman one?” 
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Cato’s speech the readers are uncertain whether Cato is responding to the mutineer who spoke up 
directly or to the group of soldiers as a whole. Cato’s diction is notable beyond its ambiguity of 
addressee, however. As was just noted, Caesar’s troops are a iuventus after Caesar quells the 
mutiny in Book 5, which is iterated twice in the nine line denouement after Caesar finishes his 
speech.
167
 In fact, this word iuventus is used almost exclusively to refer to Caesar’s army from 
the end of Caesar’s speech until Cato takes it up at 9.256.168 This choice reinforces Lucan’s point 
that the Pompeian soldiers are just like Caesar’s soldiers in the end, but Cato continues to use the 
word even after the troops have allegedly promised themselves to the Republican cause. This, we 
shall see, is not the last time that Lucan equates Cato’s mutinous troops with Caesarians.  
    After he scolds the troops for preferring Pompey over Rome, slavery over personal 
freedom, Cato uses no scintillating turn of rhetoric to convince the troops to fight for Rome. In 
fact, his advice will sound strangely familiar: ite, o degeneres, he says, Ptolemaei munus et 
arma/ spernite.
169
 Three lines later, Cato commands them again, ordering vadite securi.
170
 These 
three imperatives strongly recall Caesar’s speech in Book 5, when he tells his troops to hic fuge, 
si belli finis placet, ense relicto,
171
 and vadite meque meis ad bella relinquite fatis.
172
 Not only 
does Cato use the same imperative, vadite, in his second phrase, but each imperative that Cato 
uses in this new stage of his argument falls at the beginning of a line, making his repeated 
demands for the soldiers’ departure impossible to miss. Although Cato takes a little more time to 
get to it, the explicit thrust of his speech is the same as Caesar’s: each commander is ordering his 
mutinous troops to simply leave. Neither of them, of course, would actually benefit if the troops 
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 See 5.365 and 5.373. 
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 The one exception occurs at 8.122, when the people of Mytilene offer up their townspeople as troops (iuventus) 
for Pompey after he has lost his army at Pharsalia.  
169
 9.268-269, “Leave, o degenerate men, spurn both the gift of Ptolemy and your arms.” The gift of Ptolemy refers 
to the death of Pompey, which has freed them from obedience to an autocrat. 
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 9.272, “Depart safely.” 
171
 5.321, “Flee from here, if the end of the war pleases you, once you have left behind your sword.” 
172
 5.325, “Go and leave me behind with my fates to war.” 
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obeyed them, but they each utilize the shame of their commands to manipulate the soldiers with 
reverse psychology. Cato even goes so far as to tell the troops to seize Cornelia and Pompey’s 
sons and to cut off his own head and bring it to Caesar. Cato’s speech ends with yet more 
imperatives, the ships return to shore, and iusti patientia Martis established once more.
173
  
Cato may have been treating the Pompeian soldiers like Caesarians, given their insistence 
on the Laelian view of civil war, and reverse-psychological commands may simply be the best 
way to control a mutinous crowd. Given the myths surrounding Cato, however, the painfully 
strict idealist should not be one to take the easy but ideologically problematic route. As a popular 
feature of Stoic memorabilia and rhetorical exercises by the Neronian period, Cato’s 
characterization in Lucan could not have escaped his sizable reputation outside of the poem, 
even – or especially – if Lucan never gave him some of his most famous qualities. As Seo puts it, 
“Cato’s persona had already been schematized by the Roman habit of creating exempla to serve 
a variety of cultural functions. The degree to which Cato fulfills or contradicts the expectations 
of his mytho-historical persona can illuminate how we read Lucan’s enigmatic protagonist.”174 
Sallust famously wrote that Cato, in comparison to Caesar, did not contend with the partisan in 
being part of a faction, a quality Cato sets aside as soon as we meet him in Book 2 and fully 
rejects when he stoops to Caesar’s level.175 If we are expecting Cato to never be a proponent of 
one-man rule, an uncompromising idealist until the end, then his use of Caesarian tactics in 
dealing with the mutiny and taking command of a partisan army has to make us stop and 
reconsider his characterization. 
Although the readers may have doubts about the Stoic purity of Lucan’s Cato, the 
soldiers in Lucan’s epic repeatedly mimic Cato and try to follow him as an exemplum. Even 
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before the march through the Syrtes, Cato is continually imitated and foreshadowed in the 
suicidal scenes of various soldiers throughout the civil war.
176
 Cato himself continually reminds 
the readers of his upcoming suicide, arguably his most defining moment as an exemplum. In his 
funeral oration for Pompey, already the commemoration of pseudo-Catonian suicide, the only 
pure one line sententia clearly refers to the exemplarity of his own death: scire mori sors prima 
viris, sed proxima cogi.
177
 The only problem is that the two “suicides” apart from Pompey’s that 
use Utica as a subject of mimesis are the aristeiae of Scaeva and Vulteius, the two crazed 
Caesarian centurions who gladly offer themselves to death for the sake of Caesar.
178
 Cato is once 
again being connected with fervent proponents of autocracy, and as he assumes the mantle of 
Pompey and inspires his troops to take up arms again and march across the desert in what is 
potentially group suicide, we have to wonder at the morality of his exemplum. 
Seneca tells us in De Constantia that Cato is a more certain exemplar of wise men (viri 
sapientis) than Odysseus or Hercules.
179
 This moral supremacy should be seated in his Stoicism, 
in his dispassionate advocacy of Republicanism and what is best for the state. Seo proves 
convincingly, however, that if Lucan’s Cato is a Stoic, he is a poor one, noting his “anger, 
immoderation, and ultimately, disharmony with the plan of a malignant universe.”180 Cato’s 
speech to the mutineers is hardly a reasoned piece of Stoic rhetoric; the mere fact that it shares 
characteristics with a speech of Caesar’s shows how anti-Stoic the oration is. We can even 
anticipate the lack of Stoicism before the speech begins, when the narrator describes Cato’s act 
of speaking as erupere ducis sacro de pectore voces.
181
 Not only does this line refer to Cato as a 
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dux already, but there are words bursting out of him, outside of his control, and they come from 
his pectus, not his mens. When the ghost of Pompey found its successors after its 
metempsychosis, it settled in the pectus of Brutus, but could only invicti posuit se mente 
Catonis.
182
 Now, however, that Cato has accepted control of the troops and stepped into 
Pompey’s place, he seems to be losing control of himself. 
Cato, now a strange amalgamation of Caesar, Pompey, and pseudo-Stoicism, has to face 
his troops like any other general and convince them to follow him. Although his funeral oration 
seems to have been met with limited success, he manages to quell the mutiny with his Caesarian 
shame tactics, only to be faced with the task of convincing the troops to march yet again once 
they reach the terrors of the Syrtes. This speech succeeds again, and for a time the men prevail, 
spurred on by virtus and amor laborum,
183
 but the march has to be peppered with several more 
small speeches from Cato. Eventually, though there is no mutiny, after they are confronted with 
the snakes the men begin to complain again and ask the gods for reprieve. Although they initially 
welcomed Cato’s suicide mission like a Vulteius or a Scaeva, Cato’s men face their agon and 
crumble beneath the pressure, despite Cato’s exemplum.184 Pompey, who had too many scruples 
about freedom to match Caesar’s dictatorial dominance, could barely control his troops. His 
army becomes Cato’s inheritance, and there is brief hope that Cato will take his place over the 
troops and truly confront Caesar. In becoming Caesar’s equal, however, Cato becomes a sort of 
semi-tyrant, a passionate Stoic, whose half measures cannot succeed. Caesar journeys from 
unsuccessful speaker to firm autocrat as the books progress, and he never has trouble with his 
troops again once he puts them down. Cato journeys from Stoic to autocratic proponent of 
personal and governmental freedom and is reconvincing his troops for the whole time that we see 
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 See Johnson, 54-56 for an exploration of the catalogue of snakes as an agon for the common soldiers. 
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him as a commander in the poem. Through his interaction with his troops, we can see that Cato 
























Over the course of the Bellum civile we have watched Lucan outline a moral trajectory 
for Caesar, Pompey and Cato through their interaction with the troops. Lucan is able to create a 
rough framework for his exploration of the commander-soldier dynamic with his web of both 
inter- and intra-textual references, but although this has illuminated the characters of the generals 
and their relationships to one another, the moments of mutiny seem to have taught us more about 
the commanders who quell them than the soldiers who perpetrate them. Lucan may be more 
sensitive to the crowd than a Seneca or a Cicero, as he acknowledges the human individuality 
that creates a volgus, but his sympathy does not entirely redeem the crowds he potrays.  
Despite Lucan’s vain hopes to the contrary, the fact remains that throughout his epic, 
with the possible exception of Pompey’s retreat in Book 2, the common soldiers always stay with 
their commanders. The one man always wins. This may be every Roman orator’s dream, but for 
Lucan it shows the ultimate failure of the Roman citizen soldier, who could not find his way to a 
moral path through civil war. Such a path may not exist, as Cato’s decline from Stoicism 
suggests, but one cannot help but wonder if Cato made the wrong choice in Book 2 when he 
decided against abstention from the war. Lucan gives a tantalizing glimpse of the right path for 
the common soldier in Book 4 when the Caesarian and Pompeian armies, who are camped near 
one another at Ilerda in Spain, set down their arms and come together to mingle, swap stories, 
and bemoan the horrors of civil war, not as partisans, but as Romans.
185
 Lucan’s narrator tells the 
troops how close they are to ending the conflict, begging them to simply disobey their 
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 but the Pompeian general soon bears down upon them and breaks the 
fraternization with words and the threat of his army of slaves.
187
 The soldiers return to their 
acceptance of crime, and our glimpse of hope is lost. Lucan’s account of this event differs greatly 
from both Caesar’s version, in which the Pompeian troops mutiny to the Caesarian side but their 
general wrangles them back with violence and oaths, and Cassius Dio’s later version, in which 
Pompey’s troops surrender on the condition that they can go free, but are once again prevented 
by their commanding officer.
188
 Lucan is clearly making a point with his mutual mingling: all the 
soldiers, no matter their side, are Romans, and if that could override whatever loyalty they have 
to their generals, there would be no civil war. As an Imperial writer looking back on the start of 
the civil wars that will destroy the Republic, Lucan is painfully aware of the importance of the 
army to one man rule and the power that they grant, making his lament all the more bitter.
189
 
Republican aristocrats like Cicero had to reconcile the centrality of the masses to their 
celebrated form of governance with the fact that these crowds can, in the eyes of history, choose 
spectacularly wrong.
190
 Ultimately, of course, Cicero met his end, and the Republic died with 
him. By the Imperial period, it seems anxiety should have shifted from the danger of the crowd 
to the danger of the autocrat, and aristocratic authors could have felt pity for the crowd, robbed 
of its say in its own fate. We see this attitude in Lucan with Caesar’s characterization as the 
ultimate autocratic nightmare who can only be stopped by his troops and more subtly with Cato’s 
corruption and the suffering it causes his troops. At the same time Lucan is uncomfortably aware 
that the events he so deplores are still sanctioned by crowds of Roman citizens. Caesar was 
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beloved by the people, as was his successor Augustus, and if the populus Romanus was the true 
heart of the Republican government, they gave up their own power willingly. The citizens of the 
Roman Empire are no different from the citizens of the Roman Republic, emperors are enabled 
by armies of men just as Caesar and Pompey were – a fact Lucan’s readers will be reminded of 
in 69 – and all the power that Nero wields is not so different from Caesar’s. Lucan’s mutineers 
never succeed, not just because of the weight of the history of the civil war, but also because 
Lucan knows that crowds of citizens will submit to the tyrannical rule of many Julio-Claudians 
to come.  
 If Lucan was intent on exploring the nature of crowds, leaders and the power dynamic 
between them, with a mind to commenting on the present by using the past, why did he chose to 
do so with mutinies? The problematic move from Republic to Principate to Empire could be seen 
from the hindsight of the Neronian court as a crisis of Romanitas as the populus Romanus is 
stripped of its power, and civil war, as we have seen, is the ultimate crisis of Romanitas. Crowds 
of Roman citizens, once the center of the Republic, have become raving beasts by the time of 
Seneca: ferarum iste conventus est, he says of the urban crowd, horum rabies ipsos a quibus est 
nutrita depascitur.
191
 This rabies is not unique to crowds. In his Historiae Tacitus notes that 
rabies is one of the driving forces behind all civil wars, playing on many of Lucan’s themes: non 
discessere ab armis in Pharsalia ac Philippis civium legiones, nedum Othonis ac Vitellii 
exercitus sponte posituri bellum fuerint: eadem illos deum ira, eadem hominum rabies, eaedem 
scelerum causae in discordiam egere.
192
 Within the scope of Lucan’s poem, the mutineers in 
Book 5 corroborate the identification of civil war as rabies when they open their speech asking 
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to be released a rabie scelerum,
193
 but Caesar introduces a third identification for rabies in his 
response. At the very end of his speech, when he demands punishment for the ringleaders of the 
mutiny, Caesar refers to them as quibus haec rabies auctoribus arsit.
194
 Crowds, civil wars, and 
mutinies all possess rabies as they rage against what is right with potentially incendiary results.  
In a sense, a mutiny is a microcosm of civil war, one part of a larger whole fighting 
against another, and so it makes perfect sense for Lucan to use moments of mutiny to explore his 
central crises of civil war in a more containable way. At the very start of the epic, when Caesar 
begins his journey across the Rubicon and faces down the apparition of Roma, the goddess does 
not initially address him as a commander but rather puts her questions to viri, addressing the 
army as a group of men under her command.
195
 Caesar calls himself tuus miles in his reply, 
reinforcing the image of Caesar as soldier and Roma as leader, but brushes past her with no 
regard for her requests and is soon being called ductor.
196
 Caesar perpetrates a one-man mutiny 
of his own, casting off his identification as Roma’s miles and setting out to attack his old 
mistress for his own purposes. The whole civil war is a mutiny against the highest authority, 
Roma herself, and each mutiny is a small civil war of its own. By the end of Lucan’s epic, the 
crowd – the symbol of the Republic – has tried to assert its power against the leaders of both 
sides of the conflict. The mutineers against both Caesar and Cato, despite their narrative 
differences, have become unified in their complaints and desires, but are both forced into 
submission by their respective autocrats – symbols of what Rome’s government will become – 
using the same tactics against their similarly fallible natures. Caesar’s great mutiny against Roma 
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is the only one that succeeds. Although the rise of Augustus is years away, by the time the 
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